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INTRODUCTION

Dean Edward L. Rubin once said that the law of waiver, when viewed
as a totality, is in disarray.' Likewise, the law governing when a court
should enforce a person's purported waiver or release2 of claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' made pursuant to an agreement
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1. Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 480
(1981).
2. Although the terms "waiver" and "release" are technically distinct terms, see Mary
E. Metz, Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 50 UMKC L. REv.
351, 351 n. 1 (1991) (explaining the distinction between "waiver" and "release"), I often use
the terms "waiver" and "release" interchangeably throughout this article because the courts
do so when referring to releasing claims under Title VII. See Judith D. Keyes & Douglas J.
Farmer, Settlement of Age DiscriminationClaims-The Meaning and Impact of the Older
Workers Benefit ProtectionAct, 12 LAB. LAW. 261, 268 (1996) (noting that courts use these
terms interchangeably).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). Title VII prohibits covered employers from
failing or refusing to hire or from discharging "any individual, or otherwise . . .
discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin .... " Id. § 2000e-2. Title VII also prohibits a covered employer from
discriminating against any employee or applicant "because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,
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with an employer,4 is in disarray. Although the courts of appeal agree that
a person5 can waive a Title VII claim if the person's consent to the release
is "knowing" and "voluntary, 6 they disagree on the standard to determine
whether such consent is knowing and voluntary.7
Lacking guidance from Congress,8 the Supreme Court,9 or the United
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under [Title VII]." Id. § 2000e-3.
4. This Article's scope is limited to the release of claims pursuant to a private
agreement between a person and his or her current or former employer. It does not extend
to a release of claims when a plaintiff fails to assert a Title VII claim in a lawsuit, or when a
lawsuit is dismissed by a court pursuant to a settlement. In such instances, principles of
stage preclusion would affect the analysis. See Rubin, supra note 1,at 514-15 ("Waivers of
defenses, objections, or causes of action during a civil trial.., are governed by the principle
of stage preclusion."); see also Jessica W. Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOus. L. REV.
281, 314 n.162 (2003) (noting that the rule of preclusion "lacks the knowing element
required by waiver."). One commentator distinguishes between "waivers-for-private-gain,"
which she defines as waivers made prior to the filing of an administrative complaint or a
civil action, and "waivers-by-settlement," which she defines as waivers made after the filing
of an administrative complaint or a civil action. See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to
Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 479, 484-86 (2001) (distinguishing these two types of waivers). This Article
applies to both types of waivers, although the issue of whether a release is effective will
most often arise in the "waivers-for-private gain" context. Once an administrative
complaint or civil action has been filed, the party releasing the claim is more likely to be
represented by counsel, and thus more likely to enter into a release with a full appreciation
of its consequences.
5. I use the term "person" throughout this article instead of "employee" because Title
VII prohibits discrimination against applicants as well as employees. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2, 2000e-3 (referencing applicants and employees).
6. See O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 1991) ("There
is no dispute among the circuits that employees may validly waive their federal
[employment discrimination] rights in private settlements with their employers, provided
that their consent to a release is both knowing and voluntary."). But see Makins v. Dist. Of
Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (questioning whether the knowing and
voluntary standard applies to the release of Title VII claims).
7. An argument can be made that the division between the courts is not over the proper
standard for determining when a waiver is knowing and voluntary, but whether the knowing
and voluntary standard is even applicable. See Makins, 277 F.3d at 547 (raising the question
if the knowing and voluntary standard should be used); see generally Rubin, supra note 1, at
528 ("There are ... two basic rationales that courts employ in deciding waiver cases: the
'voluntary' and 'knowing' framework used in criminal law, and the contractual framework
used in civil law."). However, because most courts view the division to be over the proper
test to be applied to the knowing and voluntary standard, I follow that model in this Article.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 24 (1990) ("Title VII is silent on the waiver issue.");
S. REP. No. 101-97, at 13 (1989) (same); Silverstein, supra note 4, at 485 ("When enacting
laws like Title VII. . . Congress focused on defining the nature of the newly-recognized
rights and on the means for enforcement; there is no reference to the possibility of, or the
conditions under which, beneficiaries of the legislation could contract out of the statutes'
provisions."). At least one court has relied on the standards for waiving claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000),
as established by Congress in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990
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States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),' l a
majority of the federal circuits determine whether consent was knowing
and voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances, and apply a test
that focuses on the releasing person's state of mind more than would an
application of ordinary contract principles. These circuits include the
First,1' Second, 12 Third, 3 Fifth, 4 Seventh, 5 Ninth, 16 Tenth, 7 Eleventh,"
("OWBPA"), Pub. L. 101-433, 104 Stat. 983 (1990), to assess the validity of a release of
Title VII claims. See Cole v. Gaming Entm't, L.L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213-14 (D. Del.
2002) (applying the OWBPA's requirements to a Title VII release). However, any reliance
on the OWBPA for assessing releases under Title VII is misplaced. The OWBPA does not
apply to waivers of claims under Title VII, and had Congress intended its requirements to
apply to Title VII, it could have easily done so. The OWBPA's legislative history also
supports the argument that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to Title VII releases.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 24 (1990) (distinguishing between Title VII and the ADEA).
The notion that the OWBPA was intended to codify the general concept of "knowing and
voluntary" has been described as "hardly plausible." See Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank,
152 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that it is "hardly plausible" that "the highly
specific requirements of OWBPA . . . codify the general concept of 'knowing and
voluntary'...."); see generally Silverstein, supra note 4, at 491 n.67 (discussing the courts'
rejection of OWBPA standards for Title VII releases). But see Jan W. Henkel, Waiver of
Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act After Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 395, 420 (2000) ("Congress might have intended
to define 'knowing and voluntary' for all federal employment discrimination statutes ....
Almost all of the OWBPA requirements are general in nature and could be applied to a
waiver of an employment discrimination claim.").
9. As discussed later, the Supreme Court has simply stated that a Title VII claim can
be waived if the waiver is "voluntary and knowing," without providing guidance about the
meaning of these terms. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n. 15 (1974)
(stating, without further explanation, that "[i]n determining the effectiveness of any such
waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee's consent to the
settlement was voluntary and knowing.").
10. The EEOC, the federal agency that enforces Title VII, has not issued a regulation
defining the appropriate test for determining when a person can waive Title VII claims.
Only agency action having the force of law would be subject to Chevron deference. See
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style
deference .... Of course, the framework of deference set forth in Chevron does apply to an
agency interpretation contained in a regulation.").
11. Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 2002).
12. Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1998);
Bormann v. AT & T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1989) (pre-OWBPA
ADEA claim).
13. Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 521-22 (3d Cir. 1988) (preOWBPA ADEA claim).
14. Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2002); O'Hare v. Global
Natural Res., Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990) (pre-OWBPA ADEA claim).
15. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 1995).
16. Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth
Circuit uses the phrase "voluntary, deliberate, and informed" waiver. Id
17. Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., Inc., 908 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1990).
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and District of Columbia. 9 A minority of the circuits apply contract law
principles. These include the Fourth," Sixth,2 ' and Eighth,22 though the
18. Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996). However, if
one considers anti-discrimination statutes other than Title VII, Eleventh Circuit law is
inconsistent. In Schwartz v. Fla.Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1987), the court, in
a case under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000), stated that "[a]
settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, its construction and enforcement are
governed by principles of Florida's general contract law." Id. at 905. In Resnick v. Uccello
Immobilien GMBH, Inc., 227 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2000), the court, in a case under Title II
of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134
(2000), held that "even though this settlement agreement arose under the ADA, state
contract law directs our analysis here." Id. at 1350. The court, citing to Schwartz, stated
that "[w]e generally disfavor federal common law and apply it in only rare instances
concerning 'rights and obligation of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and
admiralty cases."' Id. at 1350 n.4 (quoting Kobatake v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.,
162 F.3d 619, 624 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting in turn Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981))). The court held that "[b]ecause this settlement
agreement is between two private parties, federal common law does not apply." Id. In fact,
other courts have cited to the Eleventh Circuit as a circuit that applies state law. See Makins
v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[The Eleventh Circuit] now
look[s] to state law in determining if a valid and enforceable settlement agreement exists.");
Klein v. Bd. of Regents, 666 N.W.2d 67, 72 n.6 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that "other
federal courts have concluded that state contract law should be employed" and citing
Resnick and Hayes v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999)).
19. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But
see Makins, 277 F.3d at 548 (holding that local law applies, at least in the context of a
person represented by an attorney who negotiates a settlement on the person's behalf);
Samman v. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Assocs., Inc., 577 F. Supp. 934, 934-35
(D.D.C. 1984) (relying on decisions from the circuits adopting a contract law analysis and
holding that a person's subjective belief he or she is not releasing claims under Title VII is
insufficient to avoid enforcement).
20. O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1991) (preOWBPA ADEA claim). Inexplicably, the court in Cassiday v. Greenhorne & O'Mara,Inc.,
220 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 2002), aff'd, 63 F. App'x 169 (4th Cir. 2003), applied the
totality of the circumstances standard, simply stating that "[c]ourts review the validity of a
Title VII waiver under a 'totality of the circumstances' standard," and cited to a First Circuit
decision. Id. at 493 (citing Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276
(1st Cir. 2002)). The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the district court
decision, citing to the same First Circuit decision. See Cassiday v. Greenhorne & O'Mara,
Inc., No. 02-2060, 63 F. App'x 169, 169, 2003 WL 21186383, at *1(4th Cir. May 21, 2003)
(unpublished) (affirming the district court's decision). Although Cassiday was decided
under Title VII, and O'Shea under the pre-OWBPA ADEA, relevant distinctions between
the two statutes are difficult to conceive. See, e.g., Cole v. Gaming Entm't., L.L.C., 199 F.
Supp. 2d 208, 212-13 n.1 (D. Del. 2002) ("The enactment of the OWBPA rendered the
Third Circuit's totality of the circumstances test irrelevant for ADEA purposes. However,
there is no indication that the test is inappropriate in the Title VII context where Congress
has not yet codified standards for voluntariness.") (citation omitted).
21. Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1997) (ADA claim);
Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (preOWBPA ADEA claim). The court in Runyan did not cite to Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653
F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1981), a prior Sixth Circuit decision stating that Title VII plaintiffs should
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Sixth only applies such principles
if "overreaching or exploitation is not
23
inherent in the situation.,
be accorded the same level of protection as plaintiffs under comparable legislation and
citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (which provides that a consumer may rescind a transaction until
midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction) as the
basis for the decision. Id. at 252. The panel in Odomes seemed to be leaning toward a
totality of the circumstances test. However, Runyan was decided by the Sixth Circuit en
banc, and presumably eliminates any precedential value Odomes may have, even though
Odomes was decided under Title VII and Runyan under the ADEA. The Runyan court also
did not cite to Lyght v. FordMotor Co., 643 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1980), which seemed to take
a totality of the circumstances approach. See Lyght, 643 F.2d at 441 ("Though Title VII
evinces a congressional preference for conciliation over litigation, the fact remains that a
person who claims injury from discrimination in employment practices is entitled to a
hearing in federal court .... [W]aiver of such a federal remedial right is not lightly to be
inferred.").
22. Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1987) (preOWBPA ADEA claim). District courts in the Eighth Circuit have applied the totality of the
circumstances test, arguing the issue is not settled in that circuit. See, e.g., Kujawski v. U.S.
Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., No. CIV. 00-1151DWFAJB, 2001 WL 893918, at *4 (D.
Minn. Aug. 7, 2001) (applying the totality of the circumstances test and stating that "the
Eighth Circuit has yet to clearly establish the standard by which releases of claims under the
ADA and [Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993] should be evaluated"). In EEOC v.
American Home Products Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Iowa), on reconsideration,
165 F. Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. Iowa 2001), the court identified the totality of the circumstances
factors as those factors applied by the Eighth Circuit to determine whether a person's
consent to a release is knowing and voluntary, relying on the Eighth Circuit's application of
such factors to a release of a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. Id. at 1091-96. The court seemed to presume that the standard governing a
beneficiary's release of a claim against a fiduciary should be applied to an employee's
release of a claim against an employer. As discussed later, the Supreme Court's decision in
Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 332 U.S. 625 (1948), likely precludes such a
conclusion. The decision in American Home Productswas recently followed in a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation. See Johnson v. Univ. Good Samaritan Ctr., No. Civ.
04-4684DWFJSM, 2005 WL 1705836, at *5 n.6 (D. Minn. June 21, 2005) (citing Am.
Home Prods., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1084).
23. Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1045. See also Mararri, 130 F.3d at 1184 ("This court has
held that waivers of employee rights are to be examined under normal contract principles
unless overreaching or exploitation is inherent in the situation."). The Sixth Circuit's focus
on overreaching or exploitation necessitates a review of some of the factors relied on by the
courts employing the totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044
(observing the plaintiff was not a low paid worker with "little education and little
understanding"). In fact, in one case, the Sixth Circuit referred to the totality of the
circumstances test to evaluate whether the release was knowingly and voluntarily executed.
See Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) ("In evaluating whether a
release has been knowingly and voluntarily executed, we look to . . .the totality of the
circumstances."). Also, a district court, after noting that "the Sixth Circuit instructs courts
to apply ordinary contract principles," stated that courts should consider the totality of the
circumstances factors. Howard v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 290 F.Supp 2d 784, 790 (E.D.
Mich. 2003). Under the Sixth Circuit's approach, which focuses on overreaching and
exploitation, it would make sense to apply a narrower view of "voluntary" than would be
applied under contract law principles, but it is not readily apparent why a narrower view of
"knowing" would be applied.
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Not only are the circuits in disarray, each of the tests applied by them
is in disarray. Courts applying the totality of the circumstances test, a test
that focuses more on the releasing person's state of mind than a strict
contract law test, often apply contract rules, which are generally objective
rules focusing on what a person says and does, not what he or she thinks.
Courts applying the contract law test often look at factors used under the
totality of the circumstances test, despite such factors usually being
irrelevant under contract law principles.
The disarray is not surprising. The question of what standard should
be adopted is enmeshed in the difficult issue of whether a Title VII release
should be viewed as a waiver of fundamental rights, calling for a more
subjective test, or as a contract, calling for a more objective test. In this
respect, the issue is reminiscent of the early twentieth century struggle
between "the respective proponents of two theories of contracts, (a) the
'actual intent' theory---or 'meeting of the minds' or 'will' theory-and (b)
the so-called 'objective' theory. ' 4 The "actual intent" theory, or subjective
theory, focused on whether the parties had a subjective meeting of the
minds to determine whether a contract was formed. 2' The objective theory
focused on what the parties said and did, not what they thought, and
"transferred from the field of torts that stubborn anti-subjectivist, the
'reasonable man.' ' 26 The objective theory prevailed, 7 but the struggle has
re-emerged in the context of what standard should apply to determine the
effectiveness of a person's consent to release Title VII claims.
The disarray is compounded by the difficult question of the
appropriate source of law.
Courts adopting the totality of the
circumstances test have done so under their power to create a rule of
federal common law, yet they sometimes apply state law in addition to
federal common law, or they rely on state law to give content to the federal
rule. Courts applying contract rules do not make clear whether the source
24. Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring).
25. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of ContractFormation and
Interpretation,69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 429 (2000) [hereinafter Origins]. Although there
is no single subjective theory, it generally provides for "a mutual standard 'which would
allow only such meanings as conform to an intention common to both or all the parties, and
would attach this meaning although it violates the usage of all other persons."' Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 227(3) (1932)). "This is the classic 'meeting of the minds,'
the 'aggregatio mentum' or 'consensus ad idem' of the mid-nineteenth century." Id.
26. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 (Frank, J. concurring). "[A] portion of the objectivists'
credo is that objective manifestations of intent of the party would generally be viewed from
the vantage point of a reasonable person in the position of the other party." JOSEPH M.
PERJLLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 27 (5th ed. 2003).

27. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761-62; see also Bennett v. Emerson Elec. Co., 186 F. Supp.
2d 1168, 1171 (D. Kan. 2002) ("This subjective theory of contract formation has been
rejected by contemporary contract experts and the Restatement."), aff'd, No. 02-3094, 64 F.
App'x 708, 2003 WL 21101486 (10th Cir. May 15, 2003).
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of law is the forum state's law or general common law. The source of law
question necessarily involves the larger debate over when state law should
be borrowed to provide a federal common law rule's content. Although
Supreme Court precedent suggests the creation of a uniform (i.e.,
nationwide) federal rule is appropriate to determine the validity of a release
of federal statutory claims, the Court's later rulings in other contexts limit
the circumstances in which federal courts should reject the incorporation of
state law. These later decisions call into doubt the older precedent.
The first part of this Article addresses the origin of the knowing and
voluntary standard for waiving Title VII claims and explains how the test's
origin provides little guidance about the test's substance. The second part
of this Article discusses the totality of the circumstances test and the
contract law test, explains how each test is in disarray, and discusses the
importance of the distinction between the two tests. The third part
addresses the two primary sources of the disarray: (1) whether a release of
Title VII claims is more like a contract (mandating an objective test) or
more like a waiver of fundamental or constitutional rights (mandating a
subjective test); and (2) whether the source of law should be federal law or
state law and if federal law, whether the forum state's law should be
borrowed to provide the federal rule's content. I conclude in the third part
that Supreme Court precedent dictates application of a contract law test if a
uniform federal common law rule is appropriate. However, I also conclude
that recent Supreme Court precedent dictates the rejection of a uniform
federal common law rule and requires the use of state law to provide the
substance of the federal common law rule, except in limited
circumstances. 8
28. The discussion in this Article is also applicable to claims under Title I of the ADA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000). See Poppelreiter v. Straub Int'l Inc., No. 99-4122-SAC,
2001 WL 1464788, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2001) (noting that the test for releasing Title VII
claims is applicable to ADA claims). The discussion in this Article is not, however,
generally applicable to claims under the ADEA. Pursuant to the OWBPA, to be effective, a
waiver of ADEA rights must comply with certain minimum requirements. The OWBPA
provides that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim under [the Act] unless the
waiver is knowing and voluntary." 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). It then sets forth minimum
requirements for a waiver of ADEA rights to be considered knowing and voluntary. 29
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(H). However, inasmuch as these OWBPA standards are minimum
requirements, this article would arguably apply to any additional requirements for waiving
ADEA claims. Such a position is weakened, though, by OWBPA's legislative history. The
Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and the House of Representative's
Committee on Education and Labor, in their reports on the OWBPA, indicated support for
the totality of the circumstances test instead of a contract law test. S. REP. No. 101-263, at
32 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 51 (1990). This Article is also not applicable to the
release of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (2000). Such claims can generally only be released under the supervision of the United
States Department of Labor or a court. See Brooklyn Savs. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697
(1945) (holding that a person cannot waive a liquidated damages claim in exchange for past
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ORIGIN OF THE KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY STANDARD FOR
RELEASING CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII

The origin of the knowing and voluntary standard for determining the
effectiveness of a Title VII release is the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.2 9 In Alexander, an employer fired an
employee, allegedly for poor performance. 30 The employee challenged his
termination by filing a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement
between his union and his former employer. 31 The collective bargaining
agreement provided that the employer could terminate employees for
''proper cause" but could not discriminate against employees because of
their race. 32 The grievance procedure ended in arbitration, and at the
arbitration, the employee argued he had been fired because of his race.33
The arbitrator rejected the grievance, finding proper cause for the
employee's termination.34 The arbitrator did not reference the race
due wages); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946) (holding that a person cannot
waive a claim where dispute existed regarding the employer's coverage under FLSA, but
amount owed was not in controversy); Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d
1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Brooklyn Savings and Gangi as precluding the
waiver of FLSA claims without the Department of Labor or court supervision). It is
important to note, however, that Brooklyn Savings and Gangi arguably permit the waiver of
FLSA claims without Department of Labor or court supervision for certain types of
"factual" disputes. See Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 521-22 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("We note coincidentally that it was only the release of claims concerning the
rights granted by the FLSA [that were at issue in Brooklyn Savings and Gangi], and not the
release of claims grounded in factual disputes .. "); see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT 1307-10 (Ellen C. Kearns ed., 1999) (discussing the cases dealing with the private
settlement of FLSA claims). But see Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1355
(interpreting Brooklyn Savings and Gangi as precluding any waiver of FLSA claims without
Department of Labor or court supervision). If Coventry is correct and Lynn's Foods is
incorrect, this Article would apply to the release of FLSA claims involving "factual"
disputes. To the extent this Article is not applicable to the release of claims under the
FLSA, it is also not applicable to the release of claims under the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000), and the EPA, if Brooklyn Savings
and Gangi are held applicable to the release of such claims. See, e.g., Taylor v. Progress
Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005) (enforcing United States Department of
Labor ("DOL") regulation prohibiting waiver of FMLA rights without DOL supervision or
court approval); Morris v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., CIV. A. No. 87-7063, 1989 WL 14063, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1989) (applying Brooklyn Savings and Gangi to an EPA claim), aff'd,
887 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision). But see Fais v. Williams WPCI,
Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that an FMLA claim for money damages
can be released without DOL supervision or court approval); Poppelreiter, 2001 WL
1464788, at *4 (noting that the test for releasing Title VII claims applies to FMLA claims).
29. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30. Id. at 38.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 42.
34. Id.

2005]

A STATE OF DISARRAY

discrimination allegation.35
The employee then filed a civil action under Title VII in federal court
against his former employer, alleging his former employer terminated him
because of his race.36 The district court held that the employee's Title VII
claim was barred because he had pursued his claim through the grievance
procedure, and he was thus bound by the arbitrator's decision.37 The court
of appeals affirmed.38 The district court and the court of appeals relied on
two doctrines: (1) election of remedies; and (2) waiver.39
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "Title VII was designed
to supplement rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination." 4 The Court held that "an individual does not
forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final
arbitration under
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
4 1
agreement."

The Court then addressed, and rejected, the lower courts' reliance on
election of remedies and waiver.42 The Court, in addressing waiver (the
doctrine that is important for present purposes), stated that an employee
cannot prospectively waive his or her rights under Title VII.4' Thus, when
the employer and the union agreed to a nondiscrimination provision in the
collective bargaining agreement, the union could not have been waiving the
employee's right under Title VII to be free from discrimination in return
for the contractual nondiscrimination provision. The union must have
agreed to some other concession as part of the economic bargain struck
with the employer over the inclusion of a nondiscrimination provision in
the agreement. 44 When the employee sought to enforce his right to be free
from discrimination under the agreement's nondiscrimination provision, he
was enforcing his rights under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 4' The Court noted that "[i]t is settled law that no additional

35. Id.

36. Id. at 43.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Id. at 48-49.

41. Id. at 49.
42. Id.at 49-54.
43. Id. at 51. Allowing a person to prospectively waive his or her rights under Title VII
would tend to encourage violations of the Act. Allowing a waiver under such circumstances
would contravene Title Vil's statutory policy of preventing employment discrimination.
See, e.g., Brooklyn Savs. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) ("Where a private right
is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged
or colored with the public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative
policy which it was designed to effectuate.").
44. 415 U.S. at 52.
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
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concession may be exacted from any employee as the price for enforcing
those [NLRA] rights. 4 6 Thus, the employee could not be considered to be
waiving his right to bring a Title VII action by pursuing the grievance
because this would be extracting an additional concession for the
enforcement of previously bargained-for NLRA rights.47
In discussing why pursuing the grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement was not a waiver of the right to bring a Title VII
action, the Court stated that "presumably an employee may waive his cause
of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement. 4' 8 The Court
then stated in a footnote that "[i]n determining the effectiveness of any
such waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the
49
employee's consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing.
The Court's statement regarding a "voluntary and knowing" waiver
was, of course, dictum.
The Court, in holding that the employee had not
waived his right to file a Title VII action, acknowledged that "[i]n this case
petitioner and respondent did not enter into a voluntary settlement
expressly conditioned on a waiver of petitioner's cause of action under
Title VII."51
Not only was the statement dictum, but the Court failed to explain
what it meant by "voluntary and knowing." This lack of explanation is
problematic because these words do not have an agreed upon meaning. For
example, "knowing" can simply mean "[d]eliberate" or "conscious," 52 or it
can mean "well-informed."53
Simply stating that a waiver must be
"knowing" does not identify what information the individual must know or
4
the degree of knowledge needed.
The term "voluntary" is particularly difficult to define. As stated by
Dean Rubin:
Any general principle has its uncertainties, but voluntariness
achieves a unique level of obscurity. Not only is it difficult to
prove that an act is voluntary, it is difficult to define "voluntary"
46. 415 U.S. at 52.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 52 n.15.
50. That the Court's statement was dictum was recognized in Makins v. District of
Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
51. 415U.S.at52n.15.
52. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (7th ed. 1999).
53. Id. For example, Professor Jessica Berg believes that "[k]nowledge requires both
understanding of the current situation as well as understanding of the consequences of
different decisions." Berg, supra note 4, at 314 n. 162.
54. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 4, at 314 (stating that "knowledge requirements have at
least two aspects," including identifying "(1) what information the individual must know for
the decision to be considered autonomous, and (2) to what extent the individual must know
the information, which is a slightly different issue.").
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as anything that is capable of proof. Judicial definitions of
voluntariness include such mysterious terms as "free will" or
"free choice," terms that have been sources of debate for several
milennia [sic].
Efforts to avoid such philosophical issues
lead
to
the equally uncertain field of psychology. As
necessarily
Justice Frankfurter wrote, the question of volition "invites
psychological judgment-a psychological judgment that reflects
deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society." It seems
unlikely that any court could respond to this invitation with a set
of clear legal rules.55
Dean Rubin, writing with respect to the notion of "voluntariness" in
the criminal law context, has stated that "voluntariness is an unwieldy
notion which is not amenable to direct assessment and whose use in waiver
cases has been a source of continuing confusion. 5 6 It has been noted that
there are degrees of voluntariness, and "the legal issue [involved in
determining whether a waiver is voluntary] is whether the action in
question lacks voluntariness to the degree that it should be considered
involuntary and thus the resulting waiver labeled 'invalid."' 57 Such an
analysis can necessarily only be performed on a case-by-case basis and will
depend on the context of the waiver.58 For example, "the definition of
coercion has never been clearly established-only what counts as coercion
in particular cases. ' ' 9 Some take the position that acceptance of an offer
must be voluntary if the choice is between the status quo (if the offer is
rejected) and making the recipient better off (if the offer is accepted).60
Others take the position that even these so-called "beneficial offers" can be
coercive. 6'1 Authorities also differ on whether an action can be coercive if a
party's rights are not violated. 62 "Standard contract analysis holds that
55. Rubin, supra note 1, at 529-30 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
56. Rubin, supra note 1, at 530; see also Berg, supra note 4, at 308-09 ("There are very

few legal definitions of voluntariness, and even the ethical dimensions of the concept remain
unclear.").
57. Berg, supra note 4, at 311.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 308.
60. See, e.g., Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1987)

(stating that an offer is beneficial when one offer makes the recipient better off while the
other maintains the status quo).
61. See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 4, at 519-20 (reciting Joel Feinberg's famous

example of a beneficial yet coercive offer, where the mother of a dying child, who is unable
to afford the expensive surgery necessary for saving her child's life, is approached by a
lecherous millionaire who offers to pay for the surgery on the condition that the mother
become his mistress).
62. See generally Sian E. Provost, Note, A Defense of a Rights-Based Approach to
Identifying Coercion in Contract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629 (1995) (discussing various
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the product of duress, which
consent is uncoerced as long as it is not
63
fraud.,
or
force
physical
normally means
Even if one can agree on the definitions of "knowing" and
"voluntary," one is still left to determine whether the requirements are
subjective or objective. For example,
[t]he requirement that a right be "known" can be a subjective
requirement, demanding that the person be aware of the legal
right that he is giving up, or it can be an objective requirement,
demanding only that the circumstances would make a reasonable
man aware that he was waiving such a right. A subjective rule
requires actual knowledge while an objective rule requires
constructive knowledge. 64
The requirement that consent be "voluntary" can also be a subjective
65
requirement or an objective requirement.
Thus, "the current conceptual framework for waivers contains two
components [knowing and voluntary], each with two possible methods of
proof [subjective or objective]. 66 The court in Alexander not only failed to
provide any guidance on the definitions of knowing and voluntary, but
failed to state whether the requirements should be considered subjective or
objective.
The Court in Alexander also used the term "waiver" without
explaining whether it intended the general law of waivers to apply or
whether it intended for the more specific law of releases to apply. This is
significant because, as will be explained more fully below, a release is
generally considered a contract and thus subject to the rules of contract law.
Under the rules of contract law, a contract is formed as long as the parties
manifest assent to its terms, even if they do not actually assent.67 In
61
contrast, an effective waiver requires that the party intend the waiver.
approaches to defining coercion).
63. Silverstein, supra note 4, at 511.
64. Rubin, supra note 1, at 492. For example, even in those situations in which it is
required that a person know he or she has a particular right before it can be considered
waived, this knowledge might be presumed when the consequences of the waiver are minor.
Berg, supra note 4, at 322-23. Professor Silverstein defines "knowingly" to be a situation
in which the waiver has been "disclosed by the employer," which would be an objective
test. Silverstein, supra note 4, at 510.
65. Rubin, supra note 1, at 492.
66. Id. at 493.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(3) (1981).
68. The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938). See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Robert Cagle Bldg. Co., 265 F.
Supp. 469, 474 (S.D. Tex. 1967) ("Although 'waiver' does not require reliance or
consideration, it must be intended by one party and so understood by the other."); Thomason
v. Thomason, No. CX-01-1770, 2002 WL 1315793, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2002)
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DISARRAY

Without guidance from the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal
disagree on the test to determine whether a person's consent to a Title VII
release is knowing and voluntary. A majority apply the so-called totality of
the circumstances test (a test that appears similar to the one applied by the
Supreme Court to most waivers of constitutional rights by criminal
defendants), and a minority apply contract law rules. This division is not
surprising; these courts seem to have split along the lines of the two
generally accepted tests for waiver-the criminal law's standard for
waiving constitutional rights (which defines a waiver as "an intentional
relinquishment of a known right"), and the civil law's current standard
(which

generally

employs

contract

terminology). 69

However,

as

demonstrated below, not only are the circuit courts in disarray as to the
proper test, but each of the two tests applied by the circuits is itself in
disarray.
A.

The Totality of the Circumstances Test

Courts adopting the totality of the circumstances test hold that whether
a person's consent to a release of Title VII claims is knowing and voluntary

is determined from an "examin[ation]

[of] the factors surrounding its

execution... ,7'To determine whether a person's consent is knowing and
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, courts apply a list of
factors:7 the person's education and business experience,7 2 the person's

("While waiver does not require consideration, it does require intent."). The Supreme
Court's definition of waiver in Johnson was not novel. "The Johnson Court was merely
paraphrasing the standard common law definition of waiver-a definition which courts had
experienced considerable difficulty in applying." Rubin, supra note 1, at 481.
69. Rubin, supra note 1, at 491. See also id.at 528 ("There are... two basic rationales
the courts employ in deciding waiver cases: the 'voluntary' and 'knowing' framework used
in criminal law, and the contractual framework used in civil law."). The division is also
somewhat reminiscent of the current debate over whether the objective prong for a hostilework-environment claim (which requires that a "reasonable person" perceive the work
environment as hostile) involves a more "contextual" approach than would be applied under
a traditional "reasonable person" standard, and if so, just how contextualized the standard is
(including whether it is sufficiently contextualized to turn the "reasonable person" standard
into the "reasonable victim" or the "reasonable woman" standard). See generally Linda K.
Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REv. 174, 176 (2005)
(discussing "reasonable person" standard under hostile-work-environment claim).
70. Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).
71. See Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1998)
(listing factors in the totality of circumstances test); Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., Inc.,
908 F.2d 687, 689-90 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). Not all courts apply all of the factors I
identify, and the courts do not always phrase the factors in exactly the same way.
72. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689. A high school education is
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role in determining the release's provisions,73 the release's clarity and
specificity, 74 the time the person had to review and consider the release,75
generally sufficient for this factor to favor the employer. See, e.g., Kinney v. Hamilton
Partners, No. 03 C 3905, 2004 WL 765882, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2004) (finding that
plaintiffs general equivalency diploma plus business experience resulted in the factor
favoring the defendant), aff'd, 112 F. App'x 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2911 (2005); Nobles v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 02 C 2446, 2003 WL 22326584, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2003) ("A high school education is usually deemed sufficient to weigh
the first factor in the defendant's favor."); Prunella v. Carlshire Tenants, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d
512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A] high school diploma generally is sufficient .... ). But see
Grant-Hyndman v. Olivetti Mgmt. of Am., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 7736(CSH), 1997 WL 630180,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997) (noting that the plaintiff's education was "limited to a high
school diploma"). Learning disabilities, mental illnesses, and one's mental state have been
considered under this factor. See Nobles, 2003 WL 22326584, at *3 ("Learning disabilities
and mental illness can also impact the educational factor."); Meyers v. TruGreen, Inc., No.
03 C 7570, 2004 WL 1146120, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004) ("However, since this factor
considers whether an employee, based on their age, education and experience, was able to
understand the terms of the release, the court also looks at Meyers' mental state."). At least
one court has required medical evidence to support a claim that a mental condition affected
one's capacity to understand a release. See Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281
F.3d 272, 277 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that plaintiff had not presented competent medical
evidence to support claims of depression and bulimia made in the affidavit); see also
Kinney, 112 F. App'x at 508 ("Kinney also claims that he was on medication when he
signed the agreement, which he says clouded his thoughts. But as the district court noted,
he has provided no admissible evidence in support of this claim, and his bare assertion that
the medication interfered with his will is not enough to create a genuine issue of material
fact.").
73. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689; see also Riddell v. Med. InterIns. Exch., 18 F. Supp. 2d 468, 473-74 (D.N.J. 1998) ("The ability to negotiate suggests that
the atmosphere surrounding the signing of the release was not oppressive and thus indicates
a voluntary waiver."). It has been stated that "absent an oppressive atmosphere, lack of
opportunity to negotiate should not weigh heavily in the court's analysis." Roberts v.
Comcast Cable Co., No. Civ.A. 03-397 GMS, 2004 WL 1887487, at *7 (D. Del. Aug. 23,
2004).
74. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689-90. Most courts have held the
release need not specifically mention Title VII. Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 443
(5th Cir. 2002); Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1989). But
see Cole v. Gaming Enter., LL.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D. Del. 2002) (stating that the
standard for voluntariness under Title VII requires that the waiver language refer to Title
VII). However, the failure to mention Title VII may "diminish" the release's clarity and
specificity. See Poppelreiter v. Straub Int'l Inc., No. 99-4122-SAC, 2001 WL 1464788, at
*5 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2001) (finding that a failure to detail the specific claims being waived
diminishes the clarity of the release in question).
75. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689. There is no bright-line test for
determining the amount of time needed to consider a release. One day has been held
insufficient absent some reason for urgency. See Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Corp., 86
F.3d 196, 199 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) (holding that twenty-four hours time to decide on releases
was insufficient); see also Cole, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 213 ("Allowing one day to review a
document of the type in question seems insufficient under ...

Title VII ....

"). Having

possession of the release for as many as five days might still be insufficient for this factor to
favor the employer. See Grant-Hyndman, 1997 WL 630180, at *3 (noting plaintiff "had
possession of the release for only five days .... "); see also EEOC v. Am. Express Publ'g
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whether the person read the release and considered its terms before signing
it, 76 whether the person knew or should have known his or her rights upon
executing the release,77 whether the person was represented by an attorney
or had other independent advice,78 whether there was consideration for the
Corp., 681 F. Supp. 216, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that "[t]hree days, while not
conclusive as to involuntariness, is sufficiently short to create a question on the subject.");
Meyers v. TruGreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 WL 1146120, at *5 (N.D. I11.May 21,
2004) (refusing to find as a matter of law that three days was an ample amount of time,
particularly where there was pressure for the release to be signed "right away"). However,
even a few hours might be adequate when the person is able to consider the agreement and
reject several offers as inadequate during that time period. See Evans v. Waldorf-Astoria
Corp., 827 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that a few hours constituted
sufficient time because the agreement was very simple and also because the plaintiff, with
the assistance of her lawyer, considered several other offers and rejected them), aff'd, 33
F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). Also, even when the employee does
not have access to the agreement, the amount of time he was aware of the offer will be taken
into consideration. See Prunella v. Carlshire Tenants, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[Employee] had several weeks to ponder settlement even if he did not see
the exact terms until the date he signed the agreement."). An agreement reached during
mediation will also take into account the fact that the parties agreed to mediation prior to
that time and the very purpose of the process was that a mediated settlement might be
reached. See McKoy v. Potter, No. 01 Civ.1984(SHS)(GWG), 2002 WL 31028691, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (concluding that the long mediation time negated the short
amount of time the employee had with final agreement), aff'd, 98 F. App'x 28 (2d Cir.
2004), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 649 (2004). That the employee chooses to sign the release
before he or she is required to will not result in this factor weighing against the employer as
long as the employee was given a reasonable amount of time to review the release and chose
not to take advantage of such time. Roberts, 2004 WL 1887487, at *5
76. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 1995).
77. Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1998) (pre-OWBPA case);
see also Riddell, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (relying, in part, on plaintiffs allegation that she did
not know she was protected by the age discrimination and disability discrimination laws).
This factor appears to involve not only whether the employee knew of his or her legal rights,
in the sense of being aware that employment discrimination violates the law, but whether he
or she believes, or has reason to believe, that the facts might support a legal claim. See, e.g.,
Bard v. Mark Steven CVS, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42 (D.R.I. 2005) (discussing whether
employee waived her claims "with knowledge of the facts," and concluding she did because
she was aware she had a potential legal claim against her former employer prior to signing
the release); Roberts, 2004 WL 1887487, at *6 (discussing factor solely in terms of whether
employee knew, or should have known, her termination was retaliatory).
78. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689; see also Wright v. Sw. Bell
Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991) (employee represented by union
representatives throughout negotiations); Prunella, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (employee
represented by union representative). Some courts view this factor as addressing the issue
of bargaining power. For example, in McKoy v. Potter,the court held this factor weighed in
favor of the employer when the employee was represented at mediation by a union
representative and the employer was represented by a company manager. The court stated,
"As both parties were on equal footing in terms of the absence of counsel, and [the
employee] had representation from a party presumably familiar with these sorts of
proceedings, these circumstances weigh in favor of [the employer]." McKoy, 2002 WL
31028691. at *8.
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release,79 and whether the person's consent was induced by improper
conduct by the employer,8 ° including whether the employer encouraged or
discouraged the person from consulting with an attorney. 8' This list is not
exhaustive,8 2 and the absence of any one factor is not dispositive.83 The
factors are not to be treated as a checklist, and courts do not insist on rigid
adherence to them.84 However, each factor should be independently
analyzed.8 5 When reasonable persons can differ as to whether the person's
consent was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances,
the issue is for the jury.86
79. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 690. Courts treat this factor as
simply whether the employee received some consideration for the release. See, e.g., Pierce,
65 F.3d at 571 (stating this factor as "whether the consideration is given in exchange for the
waiver and accepted by the employee exceeds the benefits to which the employee was
already entitled by contract or law"); Cuchara v. GAI-Tronics Corp., 129 F. App'x 728, 731
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the release did not provide the employee "with much
compensation in exchange for the release of several potentially meritorious claim[s]," but
that "Cuchara concedes that in exchange for waiving these claims, he received
compensation to which he was not otherwise entitled: four week's salary."); Rinaldi v.
World Book, Inc., No. 00 C 3573, 2001 WL 477145, at *5 (N.D. I11.May 3, 2001) (noting
that receipt of two weeks' compensation favored the employer because the plaintiff was not
entitled to compensation); Poppelreiter, 2001 WL 1464788, at *7 ("The defendant
maintains the consideration paid the plaintiff exceeds what he was already entitled by
contract or law at the time he signed the release. Because the defendant was disputing
liability, the plaintiff necessarily received consideration when he signed the release. This
factor favors the defendant."). But see McKoy, 2002 WL 31028691, at *9 (enforcing a
settlement agreement despite the lack of consideration). The holding in McKoy that
consideration is not necessary to enforce a Title VII release is questionable under Supreme
Court precedent. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry., 365 U.S. 160, 163 (1961)
(holding that consideration is necessary for effective release of a claim under Federal
Employers' Liability Act). Perhaps the court in McKoy, without so stating, was influenced
by New York law, which enforces written releases despite a lack of consideration. See N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-303 (McKinney 2001) ("A written instrument which purports to be a
total or partial release ... shall not be invalid because of the absence of consideration ... ").
Some courts focus on whether the person had a proper appreciation of the benefits he or she
was receiving. See, e.g., Grant-Hyndman, 1997 WL 630180, at *4 ("[a] proper appreciation
of benefits to be received puts an employee on notice that something else must be
relinquished. In the context of a waiver of federal statutory protection, it is essential that an
employee be fully apprised of the terms of the bargain sought by an employer.").
80. Pierce,65 F.3d at 571.
81. Livingston, 141 F.3d at 438; Torrez, 908 F.2d at 690. One court has gone so far as
to state that "[w]aivers under both the ADEA and Title VII require that an employee be
advised of the right to seek counsel." Cole, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 214. The decision in Cole
appears to be based on the mistaken belief that the requirements of the OWBPA apply to
Title VII.
82. Bormann v. AT & T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989).
83. Campbell v. Alliance Nat'l Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
84. Gorman v. Earmark, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D. Conn. 1997).
85. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 820
(I lth Cir. 1998).
86. See id. at 820 (holding that a jury question existed as to whether a release of ADA
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The list of factors originated in EEOC v. American Express Publishing
Corp.87 What is interesting is that the court's list in American Express
Publishing Corp. is derived from two other cases, one of which is the

Eighth Circuit opinion adopting a contract law analysis-Lancaster v.
Buerkle Buick Honda Co.8 8 The other case, DiMartino v. City of
89
Hartford,
relied in part on another Eighth Circuit opinion-Pilon v.
University of Minnesota.90
The provenance of the totality of the
circumstances test shows that, rather than being derived from established
law, it was created almost virtually out of whole cloth (though, as
previously discussed, it seems related to the test usually employed to
analyze criminal law waivers). Further complicating the matter is that the
totality of the circumstances test has not been clearly defined by the courts
(as will be discussed later). Because courts have not identified the test as
being derived from any established law that can be relied on for precedent,
the courts' failure to clearly define the test is particularly problematic. 91
Courts applying the totality of the circumstances test have said a
waiver of Title VII rights is not to be inferred lightly,92 and "the waiver of

claims was knowing and voluntary); Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 199200 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (noting that the question of whether the company gave the plaintiffs
only twenty-four hours to review releases was an issue for the jury); Larsen v. Simonds
Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 (D. Mass. 2004) ("A jury is the appropriate arbiter of
Larsen's credibility and whether the waiver and release was knowing and voluntary. The
jury should also determine whether the waiver and release satisfied the relevant
requirements under federal law."). However, there must be sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that the employee did not enter into the agreement knowingly or voluntarily. Smith v.
Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 444 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 572 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[N]ot every allegation that a waiver was
not knowing and voluntary properly reaches the jury."). An argument can be made that the
validity of a release is a question for the court. "[T]he settlement of a dispute generally
renders a case moot." U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744,
748 (11 th Cir. 1991). "[Ilf the controversy is moot, [both the trial and appellate courts] lack
subject matter jurisdiction." Carr v. Saucier, 582 F.2d 14, 16 (5th Cir. 1978). "[T]he court is
empowered to resolve factual disputes when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged."
Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted). On the issue of the right to a jury trial with respect to the validity of a release, see
generally W. M. Moldoff, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial on Issue of Validity ofRelease, 43
A.L.R.2d 786 (1955) (surveying case law addressing whether validity of release is an issue
for the court or the jury).
87. 681 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
88. 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1987).
89. 636 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Conn. 1986).
90. 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1983).
91. If for no other reason, an application of contract law is preferable because it has the
advantage of predictability. See e.g., S. REP. No. 101-79, at 17 (1989) (noting that courts
applying the totality of the circumstances test "scrutinize many different factors or criteria
on a case-by-case basis, in ,ffect promising more litigation in the future").
92. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1172 (5th Cir. 1976).
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such remedial rights must be closely scrutinized."93 Most courts applying
the totality of the circumstances test have held that the burden of proof is
on the employer to establish that consent was both knowing and
voluntary.94 However, if consent was knowing and voluntary, federal
courts will enforce the release in order to promote Congress' policy of
encouraging voluntary settlements of Title VII claims. 9 Also, an employee
cannot avoid a release "merely because the employee grows dissatisfied
with the payment for which he or she settled."96
These courts have essentially adopted the traditional common law
definition of waiver (as opposed to releases in specific), which defines a
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right or
privilege. 9 7 In 1938, in Johnson v. Zerbst,9' this common law definition of

93. Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996).
94. Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276 (1st Cir. 2002); Vital
v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 622 (2d Cir. 1999); Stribling v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.,
841 F.2d 1130, 1988 WL 17097, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1988) (unpublished table decision);
Roberts v. Comcast Cable Co., No. Civ.A. 03-397 GMS, 2004 WL 1887487, at *4 (D. Del.
Aug. 23, 2004). The Seventh Circuit requires the plaintiff to raise the issue that his consent
was not knowing nor voluntary, and "to produce specific evidence of factors that vitiated his
consent to the release." Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 438 (7th
Cir. 1997). However, the burden of proof then rests with the employer to establish that the
plaintiffs consent to the release was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 437-38. The Fifth
Circuit requires the employer to establish that the plaintiff "signed a release that addresses
the claims at issue, received adequate consideration, and breached the release," but the
burden then shifts to the former employee to establish its invalidity because of "fraud,
duress, material mistake, or some other defense." Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 441
(5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir.
1994)). Presumably, "some other defense" includes an argument it was not entered into
knowingly or voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances test, to the extent such a test
is broader than the standard contract defenses of fraud, duress, and material mistake. It
seems that it would be appropriate to presume that a current or former employee's consent
to a release of Title VII claims was "knowing" if the employer complied with the
requirement that it post in a conspicuous place on its premises a notice describing the
applicable provisions of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10(a)(2000) (providing that every
employer must post in a conspicuous place upon its premises a notice prepared or approved
by the EEOC setting forth excerpts or summaries of Title VII's pertinent provisions); 29
C.F.R. § 1601.30(a) (2004) (same). Whether such a notice was posted has been used in
other contexts to determine whether an employee was aware of his or her Title VII rights.
For example, "[flailure to post the required notice will toll the running of the limitation
period, at least until such time as aggrieved persons seek out an attorney or acquire
knowledge of their rights under the Act." Schele v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 198 F. Supp. 2d
979, 986 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
95. See Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. Dec.
1981) (holding that an oral settlement agreement under which the person's consent was
knowing and voluntary is enforceable, despite Louisiana's requirement that settlement
agreements be reduced to writing, because such a requirement might hamper the significant
federal interest in encouraging voluntary settlements of Title VII claims).
96. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 858 (5th Cir. 1975).
97. Rubin, supra note 1, at 481.
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waiver was adopted by the United States Supreme Court as the standard
definition for the waiver of a constitutional right by a criminal defendant. 99
In fact, some of the courts adopting the totality of the circumstances test
seem to view a waiver of Title VII rights as analogous to a criminal
defendant's waiver of a constitutional right.'0 0 Also, it has been recognized
that the "voluntary and knowing" language used by the Court in Alexander
is reminiscent of the language used for the constitutional waiver standard
applied to criminal defendants.'0 ' The Supreme Court has explained that,
under this constitutional waiver standard, waivers, to be effective, must be
"voluntary ...knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."'0 2 Some of the courts

98. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
99. Id.at 464.
100. See, e.g., Mosley v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 946 n.5 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981)
(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), which dealt with a criminal defendant's
waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial); Garvin v. Postmaster, 553 F. Supp. 684,
687 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (stating that "[t]he analysis used by the Supreme Court to
determine whether there has been an effective waiver of a constitutional right may be a
helpful analogy for the purpose of determining the validity of the plaintiffs waiver" under
Title VII, and citing to Johnson v. Zerbst), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1983) (unpublished
table decision).
101. See Makins v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that
the Alexander Court, in using term "voluntary and knowing," was "invoking the familiar
test of Johnson v. Zerbst.").
102. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Under this standard, "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver." Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (quoting Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)). In fact, when applied in the context
of a criminal defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, "[t]he fact that an accused may tell
[the judge] that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not
automatically end the judge's responsibility." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724
(1948). Rather, to be valid, such a waiver must be made with an appreciation of the nature
of the charges, the offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts
essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. Id at 724. "A judge can make
certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made
only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under
which such a plea is entered." Id. "For that reason, it is the State that has the burden of
establishing a valid waiver. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the
constitutional claim." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (citation omitted).
Although the Court's language in Alexander is reminiscent of the Court's language for the
constitutional standard, too much reliance on Alexander is misplaced. As previously
discussed, the statement in Alexander was dictum, and it would be reasonable to believe that
if the Court were to decide that the "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" constitutional
standard be adopted for Title VII releases, such an important statement of law would not be
announced in a single sentence of dictum. Also, the Court in Alexander did not use the
word "intelligent." This omission suggests the Court might not have been referring to the
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent" constitutional standard in its full rigor. But see Jean R.
Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 669, 678-79 (2001) (noting that in reference to
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adopting the totality of the circumstances test have also relied on the
Supreme Court's standard for assessing the validity of a seaman's release
of claims under the Jones Act. 10 3 This standard views seamen as "wards of
admiralty" and treats such releases like a contract between a fiduciary and a
beneficiary, with the burden on the employer to prove the agreement is
fair.1°4
Few courts using the totality of the circumstances test have explained
why a standard different from a contract law analysis should be used as the
federal common law rule.0 5 For those who have, it has been based on the
argument that the totality of the circumstances test is consistent with the
strong congressional purpose to eradicate employment discrimination'0 6 or
the principle that waivers of federal remedial rights are not lightly
inferred. 0 7 One court said that "[t]he contract approach.., does not give

the phrases "knowing and intentional," "knowing, voluntary, and intentional," "knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent," "voluntary and intentional," "knowing and intelligent," and
"knowing and voluntary," "[t]he courts have not drawn any distinctions based on the slight
differences in the wording of these phrases").
103. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000). See, e.g., Stribling v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 841 F.2d 1130,
1988 WL 17097, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1988) (unpublished table decision) (drawing on
maritime law for the burden of demonstrating that a release is valid); United States v.
Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 318 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (relying on Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), a case setting forth the requirements for an
effective release under the Jones Act).
104. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 247. One district court judge noted that "in employment
discrimination cases the courts have treated plaintiffs as 'sort of wards of the court."' See
Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting the district court judge
in this case).
105. In developing a rule of federal common law applicable uniformly throughout the
nation,
the Court may look to such Congressional policies as it can discern, to the
common law or statutory policies used by any state to solve related problems, or
to any other source. The Court is acting in this instance just as any common
law court would act. Its job is to formulate the best solution to the problem
before it, consistent with any controlling legislative policy.
PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS & THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE

RELATIONS 129 (1998).
106. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 1995);
Bormann v. AT & T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989); Coventry v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1988).
107. Poppelreiter v. Straub Int'l Inc., No. 99-4122-SAC, 2001 WL 1464788, at *4 (D.
Kan. Oct. 30, 2001). This principle is derived from Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389
(1937), in which the Court held that "as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver." Id. at 393. One wonders about the rationale
for the principle that waivers of fundamental rights are not lightly inferred. Is it because a
waiver of certain "fundamental" rights is usually not rational, and the waiver of such rights
is therefore itself evidence the person did not act knowingly and voluntarily? Or is it
because allowing persons to enforce certain rights has a public benefit, and enabling persons
to revoke a waiver of such rights (and then enforce them) is beneficial to society?
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sufficient weight to the federal interest in ensuring that the goals of the
[employment discrimination laws] are not undermined by private
agreements born of circumstances in which employees confront extreme
economic pressures or lack information regarding their legal
alternatives."' 0 8 Another court reasoned that cases adopting federal rules to
assess the validity of releases of federal statutory claims (including Title
at rectifying
VII claims) all "involve federal statutory schemes ... aimed
09
historical inequalities in bargaining power between parties."'
1.

What Does "Knowing and Voluntary" Mean Under the Totality
of the Circumstances Test?

Despite numerous cases applying the totality of the circumstances test,
few have explained what "knowing" and "voluntary" mean under such a
test." ° This is not surprising inasmuch as even those courts applying the
"intentional relinquishment of a known right of privilege" waiver standard
at common law never made "clear how intentional the waiver had to be and
how much information had to be known before a waiver would be
found.""' Courts adopting the totality of the circumstances approach
simply say the test is a "pragmatic one," ' 1 2 and "[t]he essential question is
whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the individual's waiver of [his
or] her right can be characterized as 'knowing and voluntary.'"'3
Those few courts attempting to define "knowing" have disagreed on
the definition. Some have applied an expansive definition. One described
the concept as a "full understanding" of the release's terms, 1' and another
stated the person must "understand the legal consequences of [his or] her
actions."'' 5 Other courts have not adopted such an expansive definition.
One said that "[w]hether [the employee] fully grasped the legal
ramifications of the Agreement is irrelevant for purposes of assessing the
validity of the release." ' 1 6 Another described the concept of "knowing" as
108. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1997).
109. Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 114-15 (4th Cir. 1983).
110. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L.

REv. 1203, 1224 (2002) ("The first problem with implementing the knowing and voluntary
standard... is that no court has explicitly defined the terms 'knowing' and 'voluntary."').
111. Rubin, supra note 1, at 481.
112. Gorman v. Earmark, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D. Conn. 1997).
113. Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276 (1st Cir. 2002). The
totality of the circumstances test has been described as a "peculiarly fact-sensitive inquiry."
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1998).
114. Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996).
115. Hudson v. Ind. Limestone Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
116. Kujawski v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., No. CIV. 00-1151DWFAJB, 2001
WL 893918, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2001).
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simply ensuring "that a release was executed purposefully, and not due to
mistake or accident.""' 7 One said a release is simply "more likely to be
knowing and voluntary if the employee understood the rights being
waived."' 1 8 At least one court has combined "knowing" and "voluntary,"
defining "voluntary" as whether the person comprehended the rights he or
she released." 19
The courts' failure to define "knowing" and "voluntary" has
complicated the use of the very factors identified by these courts as being
relevant to determining whether consent was "knowing" and "voluntary";
courts apply these factors without knowing what these factors are being
used to determine. The use of these factors is further complicated by the
opportunity to use some factors, not as a device to determine whether a
person's consent was knowing and voluntary (assuming we knew what
these terms meant), but to ensure that the process leading to the employee
executing the release was "fair" (such as when courts consider the amount
of time the employer gave the person to review the release or whether the
employer discouraged the person from seeking the advice of counsel).' 20
However, merely because the process leading to the execution of the
release was in some sense "unfair" does not necessarily mean the person's
117. Berner v. Tesseract Corp., No. 94 C 1717, 1994 WL 559138, at *3 (N.D. 111.Oct. 7,
1994).
118. Poppelreiter v. Straub Int'l Inc., No. 99-4122-SAC, 2001 WL 1464788, at *6 (D.
Kan. Oct. 30, 2001) (quoting Riddell v. Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 18 F. Supp. 2d 468, 473 (D.
N.J. 1998)) (emphasis added).
119. Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094, 1098 (5th Cir. 1976). See Rubin, supra
note 1, at 493 (noting that courts "sometimes conflate the two components by defining
'voluntariness' to require 'knowledge."'). However, treating "knowledge" as an aspect of
"voluntariness" has venerable roots. See Berg, supra note 4, at 307 n.120 (noting that
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas "use the terms nonvoluntary and involuntary to refer to
actions that stem from a lack of knowledge").
120. As stated by Dean Rubin, in discussing the doctrine of waiver generally, "[i]n some
cases, courts simply abandon their own rationales; in others, they use the uncertainty of
these rationales as a way of smuggling other standards into the analysis." Rubin, supra note
1, at 545; see also id. at 533 ("Even when the rationales [of waiver] can be applied
consistently, courts are often unwilling to accept their implications and resort instead to
standards and policies that are not part of articulated waiver rationales."). The concern that
courts will use the totality of the circumstances factors to police the process for "fairness,"
rather than as a tool to determine whether consent was knowing and voluntary, is not
unfounded. The best example of a case using the totality of the circumstances factors to
punish perceived bad behavior by an employer (i.e., conduct that rendered the process
"unfair") is Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., 86 F.3d 196 (1 lth Cir. 1996). The court's
holding seems to have been driven by the court's belief that the company might have
engaged in conduct designed to prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining the advice of counsel,
even though the plaintiffs did not seriously contest the knowing and voluntary nature of
their consent to the releases. See id. at 199 (suggesting twenty-four hours for the plaintiffs
to review their releases was company conduct designed to prevent plaintiffs from consulting
counsel). The case seems to have been decided simply on the belief that the process was
"unfair."
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consent to the release can be considered "unknowing" or "involuntary." Of
course, such a circumstance might suggest the person's consent was not
knowing and voluntary, but these factors should only be used as a tool to
assist in reaching this determination; they should not be used as an end in
themselves. If they are used in this fashion, courts have departed from the
rule that consent is effective as long as it is knowing and voluntary and
have replaced it with a rule requiring that the process be fair. While this
might be an attractive rule from an ethical or legislative standpoint, it is a
rule different
from the rule requiring that consent be "knowing" and
"voluntary."'' 21
2.

Is "Knowing and Voluntary" a Subjective Requirement or an
Objective Requirement Under the Totality of the Circumstances
Test?

Courts have struggled with whether the totality of the circumstances
test is purely subjective or whether it has objective elements. Some early
cases suggest it is purely subjective. In 1976, the Fifth Circuit held that an
employee's signature on a release is insufficient to establish that a waiver is
knowing and voluntary.122 The court wrote: "The plaintiffs' theory is that
the forms were signed without understanding. To assume that, notwithstanding strong evidence to the contrary, a signature implies understanding
is to allow a rule of contract law to play too salient a part in the administration of a remedial civil rights statute.' ' 123 That same year, the
Fifth
24
released.
rights
the
comprehend
fact"
"in
must
person
a
Circuit said
Recent courts continue to use language suggesting a purely subjective
standard. The Seventh Circuit stated that "[tihe inquiry into whether a
waiver of [employment discrimination] rights was knowing and voluntary
is, at bottom, an inquiry into the mental state of the party who is purported
to have waived those rights.' ' 125 That same court stated the person must
"understand" his or her decision to waive a substantive right grounded in

121. One could argue that once it is determined that the process was "unfair" (itself a
term that would require definition), an irrebuttable presumption should arise that consent
was not "voluntary." However, such a shorthand method of determining whether consent
was voluntary will necessarily be overinclusive, and no court has advocated such an
approach. An argument could also be made that once it is determined that the process was
"unfair," any consent was necessarily somewhat less voluntary than it would have been if
the process had been fair, even if ever so slightly. This, however, would be defining
"voluntary" as only encompassing those decisions made free of any pressures whatsoever.
No court has advocated such an approach.
122. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1172 (5th Cir. 1976).
123. Id.
124. Cox, 538 F.2d at 1098.
125. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 442 (7th Cir. 1997).
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federal statutory law.1 26 One court held that the "plaintiffs claimed lack of
understanding precludes summary judgment on waiver grounds," even
though the plaintiff was a management-level employee and the agreement
was written in "straightforward terms. 1 27
In practice, however, courts applying the totality of the circumstances
test have usually refused to apply a purely subjective standard. For
example, the Seventh Circuit, although seemingly adopting a purely
subjective approach, has stated that "[i]n order to protect truly voluntary
bargains, we do not permit claims of subjective misunderstanding, standing
' 28
alone, to defeat an otherwise valid release.'
Courts often refuse to apply a purely subjective standard when the
releasing person did not act reasonably. In a case in which a person failed
to read the release, the court reverted to state law for the proposition that
"one who signs a paper, without reading it, if he is able to read and
understand, is guilty of such negligence in failing to inform himself of its
nature that he cannot be relieved from the obligation contained in the paper
thus signed.0 29 In a case in which the plaintiff asserted he did not read the
release prior to signing it and declined to take a copy of the release to
review it during an agreed seven-day revocation period, the court stated
that "[i]t would be unjust to penalize Defendant for Plaintiffs foolhardy
decision."' 3 ° In one case, the fact that the employee chose to sign the
release the day it was provided to her did not weigh against enforcement
when the employee was given a reasonable amount of time to review the
126. Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F.3d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997).
127. Campbell v. Alliance Nat'l Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see
also Riddell v. Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 18 F. Supp. 2d 468, 473 (D.N.J. 1998) (relying, in
part, on plaintiffs allegation she did not know she was protected by the age discrimination
and disability discrimination laws). While of limited relevance to Title VII releases, the
Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and the House of Representative's
Committee on Education and Labor, in their reports on the OWBPA, indicated their belief
that the knowing and voluntary requirement of the OWBPA is a subjective standard. See S.
REP. No. 101-263, at 31-32 (1990) ("The unsupervised waiver must be knowing and
voluntary. At a minimum, the waiving party must have genuinely intended to release
ADEA claims and must have understood that he was accomplishing this goal."); H.R. REP.
No. 101-664, at 51 (1990) ("A waiver must be knowing and voluntary. At a minimum, the
waiving party must have genuinely intended to release his or her ADEA claims and must
have understood that he or she was accomplishing this goal.").
128. Pierce, 110 F.3d at 442.
129. Scott v. Home Choice, Inc., No. 99-231 1-JWL, 1999 WL 1096048, at *4 (D. Kan.
Nov. 18, 1999) (quoting Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. 1972)); see
also James v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 95 C 5869, 1997 WL 269596, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Ill. May
15, 1997) (stating that an employee who agrees to terms in writing without understanding or
investigating terms does so at his or her peril). It is unclear why the court in Scott reverted
to state law for this proposition, as opposed to holding that such a principle applied as a
matter of federal common law.
130. Kinney v. Hamilton Partners, No. 03 C 3905, 2004 WL 765882, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 7, 2004), aff'd, 112 F. App'x 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2911 (2005).

2005]

A STATE OF DISARRAY

release and chose not to take advantage of such time."'3 Also, the use of the
"should have known" standard with respect to whether the employee was
aware of his or her legal rights' 3 2 is itself an objective standard. For
example, in one case, the court, in enforcing a release, said that the
employee "had at least constructive if not actual knowledge of the rights
she waived."' 33
Other courts have rejected a subjective approach when the employer
had no reason to know of the particular reason that might make a person's
consent unknowing or involuntary, which is consistent with the
objectivists' emphasis on what a reasonable person in the position of the
other party would believe.' 34 For example, one court said that "in some
limited circumstances [emotional strain] could be a consideration," but that
"such stress would have to be obvious or at least emphasized at the time the
agreement would otherwise be final."' 35 In one case, the plaintiff alleged
she had low self-esteem, tended to be deferential to authority, and was
under stress when she signed the release.' 36 The court, although suggesting
a pure subjective approach, said that "[e]ven assuming her claims to be
true, such subjective factors cannot be the basis upon which an individual
may invalidate an otherwise lawful agreement."' 37 The court said that a
131. Roberts v. Comcast Cable Co., No. Civ.A. 03-397 GMS, 2004 WL 1887487, at *5
(D. Del. Aug. 23, 2004).
132. See Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1998) (pre-OWBPA
case) (stating that whether an employee "knew or should have known of his rights upon
execution of the release" is a factor to consider); see also Roberts, 2004 WL 1887487, at *6
(discussing the factor solely in terms of whether the employee knew, or should have known,
her termination was retaliatory).
133. Anderson v. Lifeco Servs. Corp., 881 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (D. Colo. 1995).
134. See Origins,supra note 25, at 427 ("Nonetheless, the objective theory ... holds that
the intentions of the parties ... are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather
than their unexpressed intentions.").
135. Mancuso v. Danfoss, Inc., No. 00-2626, 6 F. App'x 391, 2001 WL 371928, at *3
(7th Cir. Apr. 12, 2001). Such a holding is consistent with the general principal that
the legal discussion of voluntariness focuses on pressures and threats imposed
by others. Thus, internal pressures (such as those imposed by illness), or even
imagined outside pressures may not invalidate a waiver ....Thus, the concern
is not necessarily that a waiver was freely given in some psychological or
philosophical sense of the term, but that it is not the result of improper
pressures.
Berg, supra note 4, at 309-10. Courts applying the totality of the circumstances test have,
however, departed from this general principle. See, e.g., Wichman v. County of Volusial
110 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (relying, in part, on the employee's allegation
she was distraught when she signed release).
136. Hudson v. Ind. Limestone Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
137. Id. Other courts have been less strict. See, e.g., Meyers v. TruGreen, Inc., No. 03 C
7570, 2004 WL 1146120, at *4-5 (N.D. I11.
May 21, 2004) (relying, in part, on the
employee's alleged mental state to hold that a disputed issue of fact existed as to whether
the release was executed knowingly and voluntary, even though the defendant argued that
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"subjective misunderstanding" is insufficient to defeat an otherwise valid
release. 3 8 Another court held that "[s]ubjective evidence1 39of a party's own
belief as to the meaning of the contract is not admissible."
A subjective standard has sometimes been rejected when the person
waiving the claim was represented by an attorney. The Seventh Circuit has
held that "a plaintiff who executes a release pursuant to the advice of
independent counsel, or a party whose attorney actively negotiates the
release, is presumed to have executed the document knowingly and
voluntarily absent claims of fraud or duress.' 40 The Fifth Circuit has said
an agreement to settle a Title VII claim is enforceable if the person
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the terms or authorized his or her
attorney to settle the claim. 141
Other circuits apply state or local law when the person waiving the
claim was represented by an attorney. For example, the District of
Columbia Circuit applies local law to determine if an attorney can settle a
Title VII claim on his or her client's behalf.142 The Eleventh Circuit applies
state law to cases in which "the employee (or former employee) was
represented by an attorney who settled the matter on the employee's
behalf. 1 43 Applying state or local law would result in the rejection of the
subjective standard if the forum state's law (1) enforces settlement
agreements entered into by an attorney irrespective of whether the client
consented or (2) enforces releases despite one party not understanding the
agreement's terms.
Attributing an attorney's actions to his or her client is consistent with
a waiver standard that is more lenient than the strict subjective waiver
standard adopted in Johnson v. Zerbst. 44 The rationale for rejecting a
subjective knowing and voluntary standard in these situations can include
the employee's affidavit was "self-serving"); Wichman, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (relying, in
part, on the employee's allegation that she was distraught when she signed the release).
138. Hudson, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
139. Baker v. Potter, No. 02 C 525, 2005 WL 843169, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2005).
Courts applying the Johnston v. Zerbst standard also sometimes "fail to state whether they
are using a subjective or objective method of proof." Rubin, supra note 1, at 493.
140. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 571 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995).
141. Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981).
142. Makins v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
143. Hayes v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1254 n.2 (1lth Cir. 1999). A district
court in the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this exception narrowly, holding that the totality
of the circumstances test still applies in a situation in which the employee is represented by
counsel during the negotiation process, presumably limiting the Hayes exception to a
situation in which the attorney alone negotiates and settles the case. Wichman v. County of
Volusia, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2000). This seems to be a strained reading
of Hayes.
144. Rubin, supra note 1, at 497. "Only the strict waiver standard implies a subjective
method of proof. If this standard is not used, the court need not examine the defendant
personally, but can consider his attorney's actions to be dispositive." Id. at 504.
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the concept of apparent authority (when the attorney releases the claim
irrespective of whether the client gave the attorney authority to do so) or
actual authority (when the client provides the attorney with authority to
settle the claim on his or her behalf on whatever terms the attorney believes
are appropriate). The rejection of a subjective standard when the waiving
person is represented by an attorney is perhaps also driven by the difficulty
of applying, in the context of collective entities (such as a client and his or
her attorney), a standard that focuses on the state of mind of a single
person.1 45 Most likely, however, a subjective standard is rejected in these
situations because a person represented by counsel is not viewed as needing
the protection of a strict waiver standard.
In any event, the above demonstrates that the totality of the
circumstances test, while purportedly a test that focuses more on the
waiving person's state of mind than a contract law test, is in practice a test
that often applies objective rules. It is also a test that, while paying lip
service to the waiving person's state of mind, often focuses more on the
fairness of the process involved (including whether the employer engaged
in improper tactics) than on the subjective beliefs of the waiving person.
The totality of the circumstances test is thus itself a test in disarray.
The disarray surrounding this test was inevitable. By the time the
Supreme Court adopted the knowing and voluntary common law definition
of waiver in 1938 for constitutional waivers by criminal defendants, the
courts had already experienced difficulty in applying the definition, and the
American Law Institute had even abandoned the definition in the
146
Restatement of Contracts in 1932, believing the definition was inexact.
3.

Source of Law

Courts have adopted the totality of the circumstances test under their
power to create federal common law. They believe "[c]reation of a federal
rule rather than absorption of a state rule is appropriate where ... the rights
of the litigants and the operative legal policies derive from a federal
source." 147 These courts also believe "[n]o significant state interest would

145. As stated by Dean Rubin:

Because voluntariness is a meaningful concept only when applied to the mental
processes of a single individual, it is rather difficult to apply to collective
entities. The typical defendant in a criminal case, of course, is a collective
entity composed of the defendant and his lawyer ....
In this context, use of
waiver standards that relate exclusively to the defendant's state of mind seems
inappropriate.
Id. at 531.
146. Rubin, supra note 1, at 481.
147. Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981).
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be served by absorbing state law as the rule of decision governing Title VII
settlement agreements." '4 8 Some of these courts, however, look to the
forum state's law "to provide the content of federal law."' 149 The Seventh
Circuit holds that the test supplements state law.5
To the extent the
totality of the circumstances test supplants state law but still incorporates
such common law contract defenses as fraud, duress, mistake, and
incompetency, it is unresolved whether the forum state's law or federal
common law applies to such defenses. 5 ' Unfortunately, none of the courts
adopting the totality of the circumstances test have thoroughly analyzed
whether it is appropriate to adopt a uniform rule of federal common law
instead of applying state law.
4.

Failings by the Totality of the Circumstances Courts

As demonstrated above, the most significant failings by the courts
adopting the totality of the circumstances test have been (1) not defining
"knowing" and "voluntary," which is essential to achieving a consistent
application of an inherently vague test;' 52 (2) not deciding whether the test
is purely subjective or has objective elements, and if the latter, when these
objective elements apply; and (3) not sufficiently analyzing whether it is
appropriate to adopt a uniform federal common law rule instead of
applying state law.

148. Id.
149. Prunella v. Carlshire Tenants, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
150. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 568-71 (7th Cir. 1995).
151. See, e.g., Cuchara v. GAI-Tronics Corp., 129 F. App'x 728, 731-32 (3d Cir. 2005)
(applying Pennsylvania law with respect to the employee's argument that release of Title
VII and ADA claims were invalid based on duress and fraudulent inducement); Bennett v.
Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1229-31 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Colorado law to
issues of fraud and duress); Poppelreiter v. Straub Int'l Inc., No. 99-4122-SAC, 2001 WL
1464788, at *8 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2001) (noting, without deciding, that an issue existed as to
whether state law or federal common law applied to an allegation of unilateral mistake);
Kujawski v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., No. CIV. 00-1151DWFAJB, 2001 WL
893918, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2001) (applying Minnesota law with respect to
competency, even though adopting totality of the circumstances approach); Reid v. IBM
Corp., No. 95 CIV.1755(MBM), 1997 WL 357969, at *6 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1997)
(noting, without deciding, that an issue existed as to whether state law or federal common
law applied to an allegation of duress); Reed v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., 569 F. Supp.
672, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that defenses of duress and coercion to Title VII release
were grounded in state law, and under the Erie doctrine, state law applied).
152. As Dean Rubin has stated, "A legal rationale, if it is to be useful, should possess
internal logic .... To possess internal logic, a rationale must use terms ... that can be
applied with a reasonable degree of consistency." Rubin, supra note 1, at 528. Until the
courts adopting the totality of the circumstances test clearly define "knowing" and
"voluntary," the test cannot be applied with a reasonable degree of consistency.
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ContractLaw Test

Applying contract law principles to determine whether a person's
consent to a Title VII release is knowing and voluntary generally renders
the person's subjective beliefs irrelevant. Although a contract's formation
requires the parties to manifest mutual assent, 5 3 under the prevailing view
of contract formation-the so-called objective theory-"[t]he conduct of a
party may manifest assent even though he does not in fact assent."' 5 4 The
objective theory "holds that the intentions of the parties to a contract or
alleged contract are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather
than their unexpressed intentions."''
For example, "[t]he Restatement
authors chose 'manifestation of assent' in lieu of 'meeting of the minds' to
underscore that apparent, as much as actual, assent suffices."' 15 6 As stated
by Judge Learned Hand:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal,
or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation
attached by mere force of law to certain acts of the parties,
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a
known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that
either party, when he used the words, intended something else
than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he
would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort.'57
Therefore, "[i]ntent does not invite a tour through [the plaintiffs]
cranium, with [the plaintiff] as the guide."'
That one party "gives the
matter no thought does not impair the effectiveness of one's assent, for
there is no requirement that one intend or even understand the legal
consequences of one's actions."' 9 Accordingly, one commentator has
aptly described the contract law test for determining the enforceability of
releases of employment discrimination claims as the "plain meaning" test,
emphasizing the test's focus on the plain meaning of the release, not the

153.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

17(1) (1981).

154. Id.§ 19(3).
155. Origins,supra note 25, at 427.
156. Deborah A. Schmedemann, Beyond Words:

An Empirical Study of Context in

Contract Creation, 55 S.C. L. REv. 145, 147 (2003).

157. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.), aff'd,
201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50, 231 U.S. 60 (1913). Judge Hand's statement
has been described as the objective theory in its "staunchest objectivist stance." Bock v.
Computer Assocs., Int'l, 257 F.3d 700, 708 (7th Cir. 2001).
158. Bock, 257 F.3d at 708 (quoting Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814
(7th Cir. 1987)).
159. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.7 (2d ed. 2001).
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subjective intent of the parties.16
For example, in Halvorson v. Boy Scouts of America,16' the employee
argued that when he signed a release waiving his employment
discrimination claims, his neck was hurting, he believed he had to sign the
agreement or be fired, and he was in an agitated and anxious mood, causing
62
him to sign the agreement involuntarily without understanding its effects.
The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, noting the
employer never told the employee he had to sign the agreement or be fired
and that "the source of his agitation was internal. 163
In Horton v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 64 the plaintiff argued that a
release of all claims did not preclude his Title VII action because he
misunderstood the release's legal effect, and it should be voided under the
doctrine of mutual mistake. 165 The court held that state law applied, and
noted that under North Carolina law, "a release is contractual in nature and
is governed by the same rules of execution, validity, and interpretation as
those governing contracts.' 66 The court then observed that under North
167
Carolina law, a mutual mistake is a mistake common to all the parties.
Finding that the employer was not mistaken about the release's168 legal effect,
the court granted summary judgment in the employer's favor.
The objective theory is attained through rules that exclude or
minimize the parties' subjective intent, 169 such as the parol evidence rule,
the plain meaning rule, the duty-to-read rule, and the rule that only bilateral
mistakes allow avoidance. 70 If a contract's language is clear, the court will
determine the parties' intent by the language's ordinary meaning.'
A
release whose language is clear will therefore be enforced according to its
terms. 7 2 The trial judge decides whether a release's language is clear by
examining the contract's four corners, and if the language is clear, the court
160. See Metz, supra note 2, at 369 (distinguishing the use of the plain meaning and
totality of the circumstances tests).
161. 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 571933 (6th Cir. May 3, 2000) (unpublished table
decision).
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id. at *3.
164. 102 F. Supp. 2d 330 (M.D.N.C. 1999), aff'd, 199 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished table decision).
165. Id. at 339.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 339-40.
169. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.12, 426 (2002) [hereinafter
CORBIN] ("This result is achieved by rules that exclude or minimize the true subjective
intention of the parties.").
170. Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989).
171.

SAMUEL WILLISTON, 29 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 73:7, at 25 (4th

ed. 2003).
172. Id. § 73:7, at 25-26.

2005]

A STATE OF DISARRAY

determines its meaning as a matter of law. 17 3 A party's failure to read a
contract is generally not a defense to enforcement. 7 4 "[W]here the
language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of the release is
a 'jural act' that is binding on the parties."' 7 5 The objective theory is also
attained by the general rule that avoidance is not available for a unilateral
mistake. 76
Under contract law, as long as the parties exchange some
consideration, the amount is irrelevant. "The law will not inquire as to the
adequacy of consideration when the thing to be done is asked to be done,
be it ever so small."' 77 Thus, with respect to releases, "there is no public
policy against making a bad deal in the first place or abandoning a good
cause of action."' 7 8 At least one state does not even require consideration
for a written release to be effective.17 9
Rather than demonstrating that there was not a subjective meeting of
the minds, a party seeking to avoid enforcement of a contract must rely on
defenses such as fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or unconscionability.
These defenses can be difficult to establish. For example, "one may not
avoid a contractual undertaking for duress simply because the contract was
particularly disadvantageous or because the bargaining power of the parties
was unequal or because there was some unfairness in the negotiations
leading up to the contract.' 180 Also, the party seeking to avoid the contract
has the burden of establishing
these defenses, usually by clear and
81
convincing evidence.'
173. Id. at 26.
174. Id. § 73:14, at45-46.
175. Id. at 46.
176. CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.39, at 223.
177. Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 117 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. 1955), aff'd on reh'g, 120
A.2d 107 (N.J. 1956).
178. Rubin, supra note 1, at 531-32.
179. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-303 (McKinney 2001) (stating that a lack of
consideration will not invalidate a written release).
180. WILLISTON, supra note 171, at §71.43, at 577-79. On the issue of what constitutes
duress by an employer or former employer with respect to an employee's release, see
generally, Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes Duress by Employer or Former
Employer Vitiating Employee's Release of Employer from Claims Arising Out of

Employment, 30 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1984).
181. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hamm-Smith, 633 N.E.2d 225, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(holding that a person asserting duress has the burden of proving duress by clear and
convincing evidence); Rogers v. Yourshaw, 448 S.E.2d 884, 887 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a party seeking to rescind a contract on the basis of unconscionability has the
burden of proving unconscionability by clear and convincing evidence); Helstrom v. N.
Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Alaska 1990) (holding that the burden is on the party
seeking to void the contract because of duress to establish duress by clear and convincing
evidence); Schaffer v. Standard Timber Co., 331 P.2d 611, 615 (Wyo. 1958) (holding that
the party seeking to void the contract on the basis of mistake has the burden of proving
mistake by clear and convincing evidence); Scott v. Seabury, 262 N.W. 804, 807 (Iowa
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However, just as- courts applying the totality of the circumstances test
sometimes feel compelled to abandon a subjective approach and apply
contract law rules (such as the duty-to-read rule), courts applying contract
law rules sometimes feel compelled to consider factors used by courts
applying the totality of the circumstances test. For example, the Eighth
Circuit relies on some of the totality of the circumstances factors.1 2 The
Sixth Circuit only applies a contract law analysis if "overreaching or
exploitation is not inherent in the situation,"' 83 thus necessitating a review
of some of the totality of the circumstances factors.
Courts adopting a contract law analysis have not made it clear whether
the source of law is general common law contract principles or the forum
state's law. The Fourth Circuit looks to the forum state's law for
guidance,8 4 but it is unclear whether it applies ordinary contract law rules
as a matter of federal common law and looks to state law for guidance, or
whether it applies state law of its own force. In practice, district courts in
these circuits generally apply the forum state's law, as opposed to general
common law. For example, district courts in the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits have looked to the forum state's law for authority.' 85 The
distinction would be important if a state adopted the totality of the
circumstances test.
However, the source of law for determining if a release is effective is
irrelevant to the issue of whether the validity of the release is a question for
the jury or a question for the court. As long as the action is brought in
federal court, federal law determines whether a party is entitled to a jury
trial on an issue, even when the issue is governed by state substantive law,
and even when state law would preclude a jury trial.8 6 Federal courts have
1935) (holding that the party seeking to void the contract on the basis of fraud, duress, or
undue influence has the burden of establishing such defenses by clear and convincing
evidence).
182. See Pilon v. Univ. of Minn., 710 F.2d 466, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding the
waiver was voluntary and knowing because the plaintiff had been represented by counsel, a
standard form agreement was not used, and the plaintiff negotiated language in the release).
183. Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en
banc). The court in Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 n.9 (3d Cir. 1988),
accused the court in Runyan of considering factors not relevant to a contract law analysis
because the Runyan court noted that the plaintiff was "an attorney knowledgeable in labor
and employment discrimination matters." Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044. Interestingly, the
Fourth Circuit, in O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1991),
noted that the plaintiff received "substantial consideration," despite the amount of
consideration being irrelevant to a contract law analysis.
184. O'Shea, 930 F.2d at 362.
185. See Horton v. Norfolk S. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (M.D.N.C. 1999)
(applying North Carolina law), aff'd, 199 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision); EEOC v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096-97 (N.D. Iowa
2001) (applying Iowa law).
186. Grabinski v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 136 F.3d 565, 571 (8th Cir. 1998).
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held that certain contract defenses are questions for the court, not the
jury. 187

Courts adopting a contract law analysis have not adequately explained
why the totality of the circumstances test is inappropriate, and why a
contract law analysis will not frustrate Title VII's purposes. The Sixth
Circuit, when adopting the contract law test, simply said that ordinary
contract principles would apply, 8 8 though its reasoning seems to have been
based on the principle that the law encourages the "amicable settlement of
honest differences between men dealing at arm's length with one
another."' 89 The Eighth Circuit, without explanation, said, "In determining
whether the release was knowingly and voluntarily given, 'we apply
ordinary contract principles,"' and cited to the Sixth Circuit opinion. 190 The
Fourth Circuit, also without explanation, concluded, "We believe that the
better approach is to analyze waivers of [employment discrimination]
claims under ordinary contract principles, and, thus, we adopt the position
taken by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits.''
As demonstrated above, the most significant failings by the courts
adopting a contract law analysis have been (1) relying on factors used in
the totality of the circumstances test that are not relevant under contract
law; (2) not clearly stating whether the source of law is the forum state's
law or the general common law of contracts; and (3) not explaining why a
contract law analysis will not frustrate Title VII's purposes.
C. Importance of the Distinction Between the Two Tests
The difference between the two tests is important because it is more
difficult to enforce a release under the totality of the circumstances test
than under a contract law test.' 9 Thus, application of one test instead of

187. See, e.g., Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., 952 F.2d 1485, 1502 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding there is no right to jury trial under that the Seventh Amendment for a claim
of mutual mistake seeking reformation of contract); Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 884
F. Supp. 979, 985 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that reformation due to a mutual mistake is an
equitable issue to be decided by the court rather than by the jury); see generally Moldoff,
supra note 86 (discussing the right to a jury trial with respect to the validity of a release).
188. Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
189. Id. at 1045 (quoting D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 122 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
190. Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.10).
191. O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
192. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1997)
("[A] waiver viewed as a contract is more likely to be enforced."); Long v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1538 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the totality of the circumstances test
is "more stringent" than "ordinary state contract law principles"); O'Shea, 930 F.2d at 361
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the other can be outcome determinative. 93 For example, in Puentes v.
United Parcel Service,194 the court applied the totality of the circumstances
test and concluded that a twenty-four hour consideration period (for the
release of all employment discrimination claims arising out of two
employees' terminations) was insufficient for consent to be knowing and
voluntary, even when the plaintiffs were former management-level
employees who did not seriously contest the knowing and voluntary nature
of their consent and who received substantial consideration. 95 Under
contract law rules, the releases would most likely have been enforced. In
Campbell v. Alliance National Inc.,196 the mere allegation of not
understanding a release was sufficient to create a factual issue1 97
as to the
release's effectiveness under the totality of the circumstances test.
In Pierce v. Atchison, Topkea and Santa Fe Railway,19" the court held
that a release was effective under state contract law, 199 but remanded the
(describing the totality of the circumstances test as "a more stringent" standard than an
ordinary contract law analysis); Cordoba v. Beau Deitl & Assocs., No. 02 Civ.4951 MBM,
2003 WL 22902266, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2003) ("It is well settled that the totality-ofthe-circumstances standard is stricter than ordinary contract law principles for determining
whether a release is knowing and voluntary."); S. REP. No. 101-79, at 17 (1989) (describing
the totality of the circumstances test as "more protective" than a contract law analysis). The
test has also been described as a "more subtle standard" than a simple contract law analysis,
EEOC v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 681 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and as a
"middle course between a rule of per se invalidity and a contractual approach that would
enforce all unambiguous waivers absent fraud or duress." Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1997). Dean Rubin has stated, "If the court
applies the Johnson [v. Zerbst] rule [a standard arguably similar to that employed by the
totality of the circumstances courts] in its full rigor and requires both knowledge and intent,
the resulting criteria can be termed the 'strict' waiver standard." Rubin, supra note 1, at
491.
193. For a discussion of the important distinction between the two tests, in the context of
a person consenting to arbitrate future disputes and waiving the right to a jury trial, see
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers
of ConstitutionalRights, 67 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170-76 (2004). Professor Ware
concludes that
a knowing-consent standard could be far more exacting than the... contractual
standards of consent, and this would result in courts finding consent in far fewer
arbitration agreements. This might well be the case in virtually all agreements
involving . . . employees

. . .

who did not first have a lawyer review the

agreement.
Id. at 176.
194. 86 F.3d 196 (llth Cir. 1996).
195. Id. at 199. This decision supports Professor Ware's suggestion that finding a lack
of knowing consent is like finding procedural unconscionability without also having to find
substantive unconscionability. Ware, supra note 193, at 174.
196. 107 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
197. Id. at 240-42 n.3.
198. 65 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 568-70.
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case for the jury to determine whether the release was effective under the
totality of the circumstances test.200 On appeal after the remand, the court
affirmed the jury's determination that the release was not effective under
the totality of the circumstances test. 20 The court affirmed the jury's
determination because, among other things, there was evidence the
employer told the plaintiff the release would not waive discrimination
claims, a factor that the court felt would alone most likely render the
release ineffective.2 2 The plaintiff was also given only one business day to
consider the release, 20 3 and there was evience the plaintiff might not have
been aware that the consideration he received was for, among other things,
the release. 204 Thus, despite such evidence being insufficient to void the
release under state contract law, the release was found ineffective under the
totality of the circumstances test.
To the extent that the totality of the circumstances test is considered a
subjective test, the importance of the distinction between that test and a
contract law test (an objective test) is readily apparent. Also, the mere fact
that the totality of the circumstances test is considered a stricter test than
the contract law test reveals that the courts applying this test must be
envisioning definitions of "knowing" and "voluntary" that are more
difficult to satisfy than under contract law principles, even though those
courts have failed to clearly define those terms.
Additionally, under the totality of the circumstances test, the employer
bears the burden of proving that the employee's consent to the release was
knowing and voluntary. Under a contract law test, the employee bears the
burden of proving any of the defenses allowing him or her to avoid the
contract, and the employee must usually establish the defenses by clear and
convincing evidence. Which party bears the burden of proof on a particular
issue often determines which party prevails on that issue. Thus, which test
applies is important, particularly because the issue involves whether a
judgment° will be entered in favor of the employer without a trial on the
2
merits. 1
Two leading commentators have said that "[t]he differences between

200. Id.at 572.
201. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 441 (7th Cir. 1997).
202. Id.at 439.
203. Id.at 440.
204. ld.at 441.
205. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 514 ("[A] valid waiver of the right to litigate a civil trial
...will be dispositive of any claim that might have been raised in the litigation ....
").It is
curious that the distinction between a contract test and a stricter test to determine the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement has received substantial scholarly attention, while
the distinction between the two tests to determine the enforceability of a release has not. An
arbitration agreement might waive the right to a trial by jury, but a release waives a right to
a trial at all.
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the [totality of the circumstances test and the contract law test] may be
more superficial than real" because "[t]he cases applying 'ordinary contract
principles' generally consider the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the release, the clarity of the release, and whether the complainant was
represented by counsel. 20 6 This view, however, ignores that the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits enforced the releases in those cases in which they
referenced factors not ordinarily considered under a contract law
analysis. 20 7 The references to such factors can thus be viewed as these
courts simply suggesting the releases would be enforceable even if the
totality of the circumstances test was applied, and not as an indication that
such factors are applicable under the contract law test.
Also, this view simply acknowledges the disarray surrounding the two
tests. If a constitutional rights waiver test and a contract law test are in
practice being applied in the same fashion, this demonstrates that these
courts are not clear as to the content of the tests each has adopted. The two
tests, on paper, are very different.20 8 Additionally, the vague nature of the
totality of the circumstances test provides a court with significant discretion
as to whether to enforce a release and allows a court to reach an
unpredictable conclusion. 0 9 At a minimum, for the sake of consistency and
to enable parties to better predict the outcome of cases, such disarray
should be dispelled.

206. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1917 (1996).
207. See Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (finding that "[t]he release in this case was knowingly and deliberately executed...
."); Pilon v. Univ. of Minn., 710 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1983) (ruling that the release would
be upheld where the wording was clear, the plaintiff was represented by an attorney, the
parties engaged in negotiations, and the plaintiff did not assert fraud or duress). The Sixth
Circuit's consideration of such factors can be viewed as necessary to determine whether
overreaching or exploitation was inherent in the situation. See Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc.,
130 F.3d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1997) (ruling that a "last chance agreement" would be upheld
because such voluntary agreement does not provide evidence of overreaching or
exploitation); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (ruling that an age discrimination release would not be overreaching because the
employee was well-educated, well-paid and knowingly signed the release).
208. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 1, at 498 ("There are clearly substantial differences
between the requirements and methods of proof applicable to [the strict subjective waiver
standard and the more lenient objective standard] ..
"). The dispute over whether the
contract law test or the totality of the circumstances test should apply has all of the trappings
of a "rule" versus "standard" debate, with the contract law test being a "rule," and the
totality of the circumstances test being a "standard." Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards,
33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
209. The dispute over whether the contract law test or the totality of the circumstances
test should apply has all of the trappings of a "rule" versus "standard" debate, with the
contract law test being a "rule," and the totality of the circumstances test being a "standard."
See generally Schlag, supra note 208 (discussing the "rules" versus "standards" debate).
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IV. THE SOURCES OF DISARRAY

There are two sources of the disarray. First, a Title VII release has a
split personality. On the one hand, it is a release; under common law, a
release is generally considered a contract and interpreted and construed in
accordance with contract principles, 210 resulting in the application of the
objective theory of contract formation. On the other hand, a Title VII
release, which releases a person's civil rights, can be considered akin to a
waiver of fundamental or constitutional rights. Such waivers are closely
scrutinized, and generally require the government to prove that the waiver
was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily," 'a test focusing on the
waiving party's state of mind.
Courts must decide whether the
enforceability of a Title VII release is to be determined by the objective
theory of contract formation or the subjective theory applied to the waiver
of fundamental or constitutional rights. Second, courts do not agree
whether the source of law for evaluating Title VII releases is federal
common law or state law.
A.

Objective ContractTest Versus Subjective Waiver Test

The courts of appeal, in creating a test for assessing the validity of a
Title VII release, should determine whether a contract law approach,
grounded in the objective theory, or a constitutional rights waiver test,
grounded in the subjective theory, is more appropriate. The courts of
appeal should also analyze Supreme Court precedent involving employees
releasing claims under other federal statutes to help determine how a
release of Title VII claims should be treated. As discussed below, while
neither a strict objective test nor a strict subjective test seems entirely
appropriate for Title VII releases, Supreme Court precedent dictates the
application of a contract law test and, thus, in general, the objective theory
of contract formation.
1.

Which Test is More Appropriate?

A Title VII release, if supported by consideration, is certainly
contractual in nature. A contract is "a promise or a set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the

210. WILLISTON, supra note 171, § 73:7, at 22.
211. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745, 758 (1970). Although Dean Rubin notes
that "fundamental rights demand particularly stringent protection," Rubin, supra note 1, at
534, he also notes that a more lenient waiver standard is often employed to the waivers of
rights that can be characterized as "fundamental." Id. at 498.
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Support for a contract law test

can be based on the presumption that Congress legislates against the
background of the common law, and the common law thus generally
controls, absent a clear indication by Congress to alter the common law
rule. 2 13 Under common law, a release is considered a contract and
interpreted and construed in accordance with contract law principles, 2 4 and
Congress has not clearly indicated that the common law rule should be
altered. 215 Releases are enforced under common law like other contracts
because the peaceful settlement of disputes is in the community's
interest."6 Similarly, Congress has expressed a "strong preference for
encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims. 2 7
A contract law analysis is consistent with this policy because if persons can
avoid releases by simply alleging they did not understand them, employers
will be wary of entering into such agreements.
Although there is force to these arguments, it is limited. Congress'
encouragement of voluntary settlements of Title VII claims does not mean
Congress intended releases to be effective when persons released claims
without a full understanding and appreciation of what they were releasing.
It is also questionable whether this preference for settlement (at least as it

212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). The reluctance by courts
adopting the totality of the circumstances test to view a release of Title VII claims as a
simple contract might stem from a "waiver" not being viewed as a contract. See Stange v.
United States, 282 U.S. 270, 276 (1931) ("[A] waiver is not a contract ....).
213. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983).
214. WILLISTON, supra note 171, § 73:7, at 22; see also Rubin, supra note 1, at 513
("Settlements ... are regarded as private contracts and interpreted according to contract
rules.").
215. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-664, at 24 (1990) ("Title VII is silent on the waiver issue.");
S. Rep. No. 101-79, at 13 (1989) (same). See also Silverstein, supra note 4, at 485 ("When
enacting laws like Title VII and the ADEA, Congress focused on defining the nature of the
newly-recognized rights and on the means of enforcement; there is no reference to the
possibility of, or the conditions under which, beneficiaries of the legislation could contract
out of the statutes' provisions.").
216. FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, § 2.12, at 71-72; CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.53,
at 371.
217. Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981); see also Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Congress enacted Title VII ... to assure
equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... Cooperation and
voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal.").
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII, also provides that
"[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations ... is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title." Pub. L. No. 102166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at Notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
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was expressed in Title VII, prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991) extends
with full force to releases executed by persons when the EEOC is not
overseeing the settlement, or when the release does not require the
employer to come into compliance with Title VII. The proposition that
Congress encourages voluntary settlements is based in part on Title VII's
language referring to the EEOC engaging in conciliation efforts after
concluding a violation has occurred.2t 5 Moreover, this proposition is also
based in part on Congress' desire that employers come into voluntarily
compliance with Title VII, 2 19 a condition rarely included in private
settlement agreements. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII, indicates that Congress encourages the resolution of
Title VII "disputes" through "settlement negotiations, 2 20 the use of the
word "disputes," and the use of the phrase "settlement negotiations," seems
to contemplate releases arising out of anticipated or existing litigation with
active negotiations between the parties (which will not be the case with
many Title VII releases). 22' Also, with respect to the common law treating
a release as a contract, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
common law concepts are to be simply transplanted into Title VII, stating
such concepts should be adapted to Title VII's practical objectives.222 For
example, the Court has refused to transplant common law agency notions
223
into Title VII to determine employer liability.
To determine whether a traditional contract law approach, with its
application of the objective theory of contract formation, is appropriate,
one should explore the basis for the objective theory. If the basis for such
theory does not apply to releases of Title VII claims, support for a contract
law analysis (at least in its full objective theory form) is weakened.
The objective theory is considered a "necessary adjunct of a 'free
enterprise' economic system,, 224 a system requiring legal certainty and
stability.2 2 5 "The objective theory is strongly supported by those who place
218. See Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. Dec.
1981) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
219. See Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[I]t

is clear that Congress placed great emphasis upon private settlement and the elimination of
unfair practices without litigation, on the ground that voluntary compliance is preferable to

court action.") (citation omitted).
220. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at Notes to 42 U.S.C. §

1981).
221. For an interesting discussion of Section 118's legislative history, see Angelito
Remo Sevilla, Comment, The End of Duffield and the Rise of Mandatory Arbitration: How
Courts Misinterpreted the Civil Rights Act's Arbitration Provision, 93 CAL. L. REv. 323,
345-56 (2005).
222. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 n.3 (1998).
223. Id.
224. Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761 n.2 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
225. Id.
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the basis of contract law upon the promisee's justified reliance upon a
promise or upon the needs of society and trade. An objective test is
believed to protect 'the fundamental principle of the security of business
transactions.'

226

As stated by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh

Circuit: "[I]f intent where wholly subjective ...no one could know the
effect of a commercial transaction until years after 227
the documents were
inked. That would be a devastating blow to business.

The traditional justification for the objective theory's application is
not strong in the context of a release of Title VII claims. A release of an
employment discrimination claim, like a release of a personal injury
claim, 228 is not a commercial transaction, and an employer's need to rely on
a person's promise not to sue is not as strong as a company's need to rely
on promises made in a commercial context; employers will usually not
change position based on a promise not to sue. 229 Not surprisingly, "[t]he
classic clarion call for a return to a subjective theory [of contract
formation], 230 was in a case involving an employee's release of claims
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 3
If the objective theory of contracts is not particularly suited to an
employee releasing Title VII claims, should such a release be viewed as a
waiver of fundamental or constitutional rights, like the totality of the
circumstances courts seem to treat it? While the importance of preventing
employment discrimination cannot be understated, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" standard for

226. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 25 (2d ed.
1977) (footnotes omitted) (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, I A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 35 (3d ed. 1957)).
227. Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J.).
228. See CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.34, at 174-75.
229. Although there will be exceptions (such as failing to preserve evidence), in such a
situation, avoidance of the release could be denied on those grounds. However, the danger
that an employer will fail to preserve evidence is minimized by the short time frames under
which a person must assert a Title VII claim. A person must file a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice (the
amount of days depending on whether the state has an agency authorized to grant or seek
relief from employment discrimination practices). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000). The EEOC
is required to notify the employer within ten days of receipt of the charge. Id. Thus,
employers will (presumably) be advised of a charge within one year of the alleged unlawful
employment practice. Also, employers are required to preserve employment records for one
year from the date of the making of the record or the personnel action involved, whichever
is later. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2004).
230. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 226, at 24 n.5 (citation omitted).
231. See Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring) (arguing for the application of the subjective theory of contract formation, at
least with respect to releases by employees).
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waiving constitutional rights23 2 should not be uncritically applied to the

potential waiver of all constitutional rights. "Even in the criminal context,
the Court has not consistently applied this standard.,

233

"Whether a

particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate
personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for
be particularly informed
waiver; and whether the defendant's choice must
23 4
or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.,
For example, the Court, in rejecting the argument that the "voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent" constitutional standard should apply to a waiver
of the Fourth Amendment's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, stated that the standard is designed to preserve the fairness of the
criminal trial process. 235 The Court noted that "[a]lmost without exception,
the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only
to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in
order to preserve a fair trial.,

236

The Court concluded:

In short, there is nothing in the purposes or application of the
["voluntary, knowing, and intelligent"] waiver requirements ...
that justifies, much less compels, the easy equation of a knowing
waiver with a consent search. To make such an equation is to
generalize from the broad rhetoric of some of our decisions, and
to ignore the substance of the differing constitutional guarantees.
We decline to follow what one judicial scholar has termed "the
domino method of constitutional adjudication ...

wherein every

explanatory statement in a previous opinion is made the basis for
extension to a wholly different situation. 237
When courts have employed the strict standard in the criminal law
context, they have used a subjective method of proof, but when a more
lenient standard is employed, they have used an objective method of

232. When referring to the general constitutional waiver standard, I use the terms
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" because these are the terms used by the Court. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that waivers, to be effective,
must be "voluntary ... knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences").
% 233. Ware, supra note 193, at 181; see also Rubin, supra note 1, at 496 (noting that
courts have applied a less demanding waiver standard to certain rights connected with
criminal adjudications, including "the right to be tried in the district where the offense was
committed, to be present at one's trial, to raise defenses and objections, and to avoid selfincrimination at trial," and that such rights need not be waived knowingly).
234. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
235. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
236. Id. at 237.
237. Id. at 246 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure,53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 950 (1965)). For a discussion of the Court's rejection in
Schneckloth of the requirement that a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights be "knowing" or
that it be subjectively voluntary, see Rubin, supra note 1, at 505-07.
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proof. 238

A wholesale adoption of the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent",
constitutional standard to releases under Title VII fails to take into
consideration the Supreme Court's statements regarding the limited
applicability of that standard. In fact, the Court has never held that a
similar standard applies in the civil context (though the Court has suggested
it does). 239 "While knowing consent to waive a constitutional right is
sometimes not required in the criminal context, it is often not required in
the civil context., 240 A commentator recently concluded that "contract-law
standards of consent are at least as common as knowing-consent
standards
24
in the law governing civil waivers of constitutional rights. '
Furthermore, Title VII was enacted under Congress' discretionary
power to regulate commerce.242 If the Constitution does not require that
Title VII be adopted, there can be nothing constitutionally suspect in
allowing a person to waive such a claim. If some constitutional waivers
need not satisfy the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" constitutional
standard, it is doubtful waivers of statutory rights should have to satisfy
such a heightened standard.24 3
However, a subjective standard might be supported by the general
requirement that a waiver be intentional,244 a requirement that is
238. Rubin, supranote 1, at 497.
239. In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Court applied the
standard to a civil case but did not hold that the standard must necessarily apply, finding the
waiver at issue was made "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly." Id.at 187. In Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court again found it unnecessary to resolve the issue,
simply holding that "a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least,
be clear." Id.at 95. The Court stated, "We need not concern ourselves with the
involuntariness or unintelligence of a waiver when the contractual language relied upon
does not, on its face, even amount to a waiver." Id.
240. Ware, supra note 193, at 182.
241. Id. at 197-98. Dean Rubin believes that "the Court [in Overmyer] suggested...
that contract law provides the standard for determining whether civil law waivers satisfy the
due process clause." Rubin, supra note 1, at 518. Dean Rubin also states that this
suggestion was repeated in Fuentes, and that "[f]ower federal courts have also followed the
idea in Overmyer that waivers of notice and hearing must be judged by contractual
standards." Id.But see Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 228 F.3d 897, 908 n.8 (8th Cirl
2000) (Beam, J., dissenting) (collecting cases from courts of appeal holding that the
standard is the same in the civil context as in the criminal context).
242. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979).
243. Dean Rubin has noted that "[t]he Supreme Court [in Johnson v. Zerbst] may have
adopted the common law definition ... because it wanted to apply a particularly stringent
definition in cases involving waivers of constitutional rights." Rubin, supra note 1, at 481
n.27.
244. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Robert Cagle Bldg. Co., 265 F. Supp. 469, 474
(S.D. Tex. 1967) ("Although 'waiver' does not require reliance or consideration, it must be
intended by one party and so understood by the other."); Thomason v. Thomason, No. CX01-1770, 2002 WL 1315793, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2002) ("While waiver does not
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understandable. A waiver is not considered a contract, 245 and thus waivers
often lack the protections afforded by contract law rules that help increase
the likelihood agreements are entered into by the parties with an
understanding of the agreement's terms. For example, because a waiver is
not considered a contract, a "[w]aiver of a right or a benefit may be
established by . . . acquiescence, and even the silence of a party. 246 A

waiver generally does not require agreement, consideration, or even
reliance.24 7
Thus, because a waiver can be established without
demonstrating the existence of a contract (and the concomitant
requirements that help increase the likelihood the agreement is entered into
with an understanding of its terms), it is understandable that before
declaring a waiver effective, it should be determined if the waiver was
intended. For example, if the party waiving a right does not receive
consideration in return for the waiver, there is a real question as to whether
the releasing party understood what he or she was doing. After all, who
gives up something for nothing?
When a waiver, however, is derived from a contract between private
parties (which will most often be the case with a release of Title VII
claims), a contract analysis, not a waiver analysis, would seem appropriate.
As stated by Dean Rubin:
[C]ivil law waivers are judged according to contract law
principles. This is not surprising since civil law permits parties
to structure their own legal relationships and to contractually
agree to waive rights to which they would otherwise be entitled.
Contract law seems a natural source of principles for analyzing
waivers of this kind.248
In such a situation, the protections afforded by contract law would
apply, thus decreasing the need for a determination that the release was
intended.
For example, unlike waivers of constitutional rights, which will often
occur without the exchange of consideration, a release of Title VII claims,
made pursuant to an agreement, will usually include such an exchange ("I
will provide you with $2000 in severance pay in return for a complete
release"), thus creating a presumption the releasing party understood he or
she was giving something up in return for the consideration. If there is a
lack of consideration, there is generally not an enforceable promise, and
require consideration, it does require intent.").
245. Stange v. United States, 282 U.S. 270, 276 (1931).
246. Mitchell v. Kemp & Burpee Mfg. Co., 218 F. 843, 846 (3d Cir. 1915).
247. See David V. Snyder, The Law of Contractand the Concept of Change: Public and
Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 607,
626 (1999) ("A waiver does not require agreement, consideration, or reliance ... .
248. Rubin, supra note 1, at 512.
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Also, waiving rights in the context of a contract

generally involves "far less danger of overreaching and duress by the party
seeking to enforce the waiver" than waivers in noncontractual settings.25 °
Another reason why a contract analysis might be more suitable than the
waiver analysis employed in the criminal law context is that one of the
theories supporting the enforcement of contracts-reliance by the
promisee 1'-has questionable application with respect to waivers of
constitutional rights by criminal defendants (though, as previously
discussed, the degree of reliance by an employer in the context of a Title
VII release will usually be limited).252
Significant authority exists, however, for the proposition that a waiver
analysis still applies even if the waiver is within a contract between parties.
For example, with respect to waiving the right to a jury trial in a civil case,
one commentator has noted that "it is clear that the presumption against
waiver is applicable in the contractual context as well.,

253

Distinguishing

between waivers within contracts and waivers without contracts might
therefore oversimplify the issue. Ultimately, the question is whether "more
than contract law is involved, ' 254 even when the waiver is within a contract.
In conclusion, while an agreement to release Title VII claims might
not require the application of the objective theory of contracts like a
contract in a commercial transaction, it also does not require application of
the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" constitutional waiver standard. A
Title VII release seems to fall somewhere between the two standards,
which explains why the totality of the circumstances courts often apply
contract rules, and why contract law courts often apply the totality of the
circumstances factors. 55
249. But see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-303 (McKinney 2001) (providing that consideration is not required for written release).
250. L&R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 755 (Conn. 1998); see also Ware,
supra note 193, at 182 n.88 (finding a smaller probability of abuse when constitutional
rights are waived in the civil context because the waiver is part of a contract).
251. See Perillo, supra note 26, at 9 ("Proponents of the reliance theory of contracts
profess to see the foundation of contract law not in the will of the promisor to be bound but
in the expectations engendered by, and the promisee's consequent reliance upon, the
promise.").
252. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 535 ("The argument that waivers should be enforced to
protect those who rely on them is especially questionable in the context of criminal law.").
253. Stemlight, supra note 102, at 677.
254. Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
(referring to waiver of right to jury trial in arbitration agreement).
255. The Seventh Circuit has seemingly acknowledged that the appropriate test falls
somewhere between, noting that the court rejects a "pure contract analysis," yet also does
not "permit claims of subjective misunderstanding, standing alone, to defeat an otherwise
valid release .. " Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 110 F.3d 431, 442 (7th Cir.
1997). Dean Rubin, concluding that the two existing rationales for analyzing waivers (the
strict Johnson v. Zerbst standard and the more lenient contract standard) "fail to strike an
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The courts of appeal, however, need not address the question of
whether a Title VII release should be treated as a waiver of fundamental or
constitutional rights or as a contract, or perhaps as something in between.
As discussed below, Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that
general contract law principles (and, thus, for the most part, the objective
theory of contract formation) 2 6 should apply to a uniform federal common
adequate balance between [the] values and dangers [of waivers]," Rubin, supra note 1, at
536, developed a "general theory of waiver," which he describes as the "functional
equivalence standard." See id. at 536-63. Dean Rubin's "functional equivalence standard"
would enforce waivers only if "the parties who waive a particular right obtain the functional
equivalent of that right in the context of their more informal interaction." Id.at 537. Dean
Rubin states that
[s]ettlements... serve as functional equivalents of judgment after trial and will
generally foreclose subsequent consideration of the issue. They must therefore
[under the "functional equivalence standard"] reach a result that a court might
have reached .... In procedural terms, the party executing the waiver must
receive notice that the agreement constitutes a settlement ... and the agreement
must be specifically bargained for. Given the nature of a settlement ... this is
typically the case; settlement negotiations will be invalidated only if they are the
product of an influence that could not be brought to bear in court, such as duress
or fraud.
Id.at 554-55. An alternative theory, premised on the concept of autonomy, has been
developed by Professor Jessica Berg. See Berg, supra note 4, at 324. Unlike Dean Rubin,
Professor Berg argues that her theory functions both descriptively and normatively. Id.
Since I conclude below that Supreme Court precedent dictates that a uniform federal
common law rule be premised on contract law principles (presuming, of course, that a
uniform federal common law rule is appropriate), I do not attempt to devise what I believe
would be an appropriate standard between a strict objective test and a strict subjective test.
Nor do I address what the standard would look like under Dean Rubin's "functional
equivalence standard" or Professor Berg's "autonomy" standard.
256. The extent to which modem contract law principles reject a strict objective theory
of contract formation is an issue beyond the scope of this Article. However, modem
contract law, in contrast to classical contract law, does incorporate subjective elements. See
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and
Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1994) ("A deep difference between classical
contract law and modem contract law is that classical contract law tended to be objective
and standardized, while modem contract law tends to include subjective and individualized
elements as well."). As discussed in the portion of this Article addressing choice of law,
state contract law might often address the concerns of those courts adopting the totality of
the circumstances test as a result of the modem trend to retreat, in certain circumstances,
from the strict objective theory of mutual assent. In other words, general contract law
principles might include exceptions to the objective theory of contract formation sufficient
to result in a test for the release of claims under Title VII that falls somewhere between a
strict objective test and a strict subjective test. The critical point with respect to Supreme
Court precedent dictating the application of contract law principles is not that there is no
room for exceptions to the strict objective theory of mutual assent, but that the test (and any
exceptions to the objective theory) must be found within contract law principles, not general
waiver principles. The totality of the circumstances test, a seemingly subjective test with
the burden of proof on the defendant to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver, has no
foundation in contract law principles and cannot be supported under Supreme Court
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law rule governing the enforceability of releases under Title VII (assuming,
of course, that a uniform federal common law rule is appropriate, an issue
discussed later).257 Interestingly, in determining the appropriate test for
assessing the enforceability of a Title VII release, federal courts have
neglected this precedent.258
2.

Supreme Court Precedent Compels the Application of Contract
Law Principles (if a Uniform Federal Common Law Rule is
Appropriate)

In 1942, in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,259 the Supreme Court
set forth the standard for the enforceability of releases under the Jones
Act; 260 the Jones Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal
injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an
action for damages at law.",261 The Act was passed to ensure "that seamen

would have the same rights to recover for negligence as other tort
'' 6
victims.
VtiS,,262

The Court held that a release between an employer and its seaman
employee is to be judged according to the standard for contracts between
fiduciaries and beneficiaries. The Court held that seamen are viewed as
"wards of the admiralty," and "are treated in the same manner as courts of
equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their expectancies,
wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trustent with their trustees. 263
The Court stated the employer bears the burden of proving "that no
advantage has been taken; and his burden is particularly heavy where there

precedent.
257. As I later explain, I believe a uniform federal common law rule is not appropriate.
Rather, state law should generally provide the substance for the federal common law rule.
The application of state law is not only dictated by recent Supreme Court precedent (as I
explain below), it also has the practical advantage of not requiring federal courts to
determine general common law principles with respect to any exceptions to the objective
theory of contracts. Such a task seems daunting.
258. Because the Court in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), stated
that "presumably" a person can waive Title VII claims, id. at 52, and because no circuit
holds otherwise, I do not consider an argument that the holdings in the FLSA context should
be extended to Title VII claims and that Title VII claims cannot be waived without EEOC or
court supervision. See supranote 28.
259. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
260. Ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (codified as -amended at 46 U.S.C. § 688
(2000)).
261. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (2000).
262. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (quoting G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 328-29 (2d ed. 1975)).

263. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 246 (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D.
Me. 1823) (No. 6047).
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has been inadequacy of consideration., 264
releases are subject to careful scrutiny. 'One
signed away his rights to what in law is due
the burden of sustaining the release as
comprehended by the seaman.'

' 265

The Court held that "[s]uch
who claims that a seaman has
him must be prepared to take
fairly made with and fully

Under this standard, "the burden is

upon one who sets up a seaman's release to show that it was executed
freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman
with full understanding of his rights., 266 Interestingly, the Court, in
establishing the appropriate standard for determining the enforceability of a
release under the Jones Act, used contract law language, equating such a
release to a contract between beneficiaries and fiduciaries.2 67
After the Court's decision in Garrett,whether its holding was to be
extended to employees other than seamen was an open question. For
26 8 Judge
example, in 1946, in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad,
Jerome
Frank, in a concurring opinion, addressed the appropriate standard for
determining the enforceability of a release by an employee under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). 269 The FELA is similar to the
Jones Act (and Title VII) in that it is designed to provide a remedy for
employees injured as a result of actions by their employers. The FELA,
enacted in 1906, is designed "to provide a federal remedy for railroad
workers who suffer personal injuries as a result of the negligence of their
employer or their fellow employees.,

27 °

"A primary purpose of the Act

was to eliminate a number of traditional defenses to tort liability and to
facilitate recovery in meritorious cases. 27' The Court has described the
FELA as a "broad remedial statute," and has adopted a standard of liberal
construction to accomplish Congress' objectives.272 Section 5 of the FELA
provides that any contract enabling any common carrier to "exempt itself
264. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 247.
265. Id. at 248 (quoting Harmon v. United States, 59 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1932)).
266. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248. Under the rule set forth in Garrett, a seaman's release is
not executed knowingly and voluntarily simply because he understood that he was
relinquishing whatever rights he possessed. Orsini v. O/S Seabrooke O.N., 247 F.3d 953,

964 (9th Cir. 2001). When the seaman is not represented by an attorney, "the vessel's
owner or agent [is] obligated to advise him of his undisputed legal rights and possible
causes of action against the ship." Id. The owner is required to make a "full, fair and
complete disclosure as to all of [a seaman's] rights, including his right to sue for damages
under the Jones Act." Id.(quoting Blake v. W.R. Chamberlin & Co., 176 F.2d 511, 513 n. 1
(9th Cir. 1949)).
267. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 247 ("The analogy suggested by Justice Story ... between

seamen's contracts and those of fiduciaries and beneficiaries remains, under the prevailing
rule treating seaman as wards of admiralty, a close one.").
268. 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946).
269. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000)).
270. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987).

271. Id.
272. Id.at 562.
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273
from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void.,
Section 5 was passed to remedy the problem of many railroads insisting on
a contract with their employees that discharged the railroad from liability
for personal injuries. 74
Judge Frank argued in Ricketts that releases under the FELA should be
governed by the same standard as releases under the Jones Act.275 Judge
Frank took the objective theory to task, particularly with respect to its
application to releases by employees, stating, "I believe that the courts
should now say forthrightly that the judiciary regards the ordinary
employee as one who needs and will receive the special protection of the
courts when,
for a small consideration, he has given a release after an
6

injury.,,

27

277

In 1948, the Supreme Court in Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad
addressed the standard for releases by employees under the FELA. The
decision in Callen would determine whether the Court would adopt Judge
Frank's belief that any employee giving his or her employer a release
should receive the special protection of the Garrett(at least when given for
small consideration) standard, or whether that standard would stop at the
Jones Act.
The Court in Callen did not follow Judge Frank's opinion in Ricketts,
instead holding that
the releases of railroad employees stand on the same basis as the
releases of others. One who attacks a settlement must bear the
burden of showing that the contract he has made is tainted with
invalidity, either by fraud practiced upon him or by a mutual
mistake under which both parties acted.

It is obvious that a release is not a device to exempt from
liability but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to
that extent recognizing its possibility. Where controversies exist
as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much, Congress
has not said that parties may not settle their claims without
litigation. 78
The Court rejected the argument that the employer should bear the
burden of establishing the validity of the release, regardless of the potential

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

45 U.S.C. § 55 (2000).
Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998).
Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
Id. at 768.
332 U.S. 625 (1948).
Id. at 630-31.
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inequality of bargaining power between the parties.279 The Court felt that
such a change should be left to Congress and stated that until Congress
"adopt[s] a policy depriving settlements of litigation of their prima facie
validity ... the releases of railroad employees stand on the same basis as
the releases of others. 2 s Four justices dissented, believing that releases
under the FELA should be governed by the same standard as releases under
the Jones Act.2 8'
The force of the Callen holding for Title VII purposes cannot be
ignored. The FELA is similar to Title VII in that they are both remedial
statutes interpreted broadly to effectuate their purposes. Arguably, releases
under the FELA should be subject to a standard that makes it more difficult
to enforce such releases because Title VII does not contain a provision
similar to the FELA's Section 5, and in fact Title VII has been interpreted
to favor the voluntary settlement of claims.282
Furthermore, employees under Title VII cannot be considered wards
of the court or their employer to the same extent seamen are considered
wards of admiralty. "[The admiralty] rules are designed to protect seamen
injured at sea, usually far from home, who, particularly when injured, are to
be treated as wards of the vessel., 283 The law has a "tendency to treat
seamen as virtually incompetent, 2 84 a characterization that does not apply
to all employees. Unlike seamen, other employees are usually not
geographically isolated and will have ready access to attorneys. For
example, the Second Circuit refused to apply the holding in Garrett to a
release of claims executed by a longshoreman for injuries sustained aboard
ship, and instead applied the holding in Callen for the following reasons:

279. Id.at 630.
280. Id.
281. Id.at 631 (Black, J., Douglas, J., Murphy, J., Rutledge, J., dissenting).
282. See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981) ("In enacting Title
VII, Congress expressed a strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of
employment discrimination claims."); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974) ("Congress enacted Title VII ...to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. . . .Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the
preferred means for achieving this goal."); Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d
1207, 1209 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981) ("Congress has mandated a policy of encouraging voluntary
settlement of Title VII claims."). Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII, also provides that "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations...
is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law
amended by this title." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at
Notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
283. Orsini v. O/S Seabrooke O.N., 614,410, 247 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir. 2001).
284. Daniel C. Cohn, Note, Displacement of State Rules of Decision in Construing
Releases of FederalClaims, 63 CORNELL L.REv. 339, 350 (1978).
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[L]ongshoremen do not share with seamen the special problems
that may justify the invalidation of releases executed by them
because of inadequate advice of counsel.
The particularly authoritarian relationship of shipowners and
their representatives to seamen and the isolation of the latter from
the legal, economic, and psychological support of a landbased
community may put the seamen at a serious bargaining
disadvantage.
Longshoremen, more closely similar to other
workers ashore, do not confront these problems. Nor do we think
special treatment of longshoremen is dictated by other
considerations formerly cited to justify the status of seamen as
wards of admiralty,' such as their alleged propensity toward
'rashness' and 'credulity,' . . . and the United States' military and
commercial interest in protecting its maritime industry ....
In short, we see no compelling reason to apply more stringent
standards to longshoremen's releases for injuries sustained
aboard ship than to those entered into by longshoremen and other
workers for injuries sustained ashore.285
Accordingly, Callen not only supports application of a contract law
standard, it compels it (assuming a uniform federal common law rule is
appropriate).286 This is particularly true because it is presumed Congress is
familiar with the Court's precedents and expects its statutes to be read in
conformity with such precedents.287
Although lower courts have placed some limitations on the
applicability of Callen's holding, these limitations are not applicable to
Title VII cases. The Sixth Circuit has held that Callen's holding is limited
to releases for those injuries known to the employee at the time the release
is executed.2 88 The Third Circuit has held that Callen's holding is limited

285. Capotorto v. Compania Sud Americana de Vapores Chilean Line, Inc., 541 F.2d
985, 987 (2d Cir. 1976).
286. Application of the Callen standard would not, however, automatically result in a
traditional contract law analysis being applied in all instances. For example, the Court has
rejected the application of the tender back rule to releases under the FELA on the grounds it
is inconsistent with the Act's policy of providing compensation to injured workers. See
Hogue v. S. Ry., 390 U.S. 516, 517 (1968) (holding that an express agreement requiring the
injured employee to make a tender back to the employer before suing the employer on a
FELA claim is void under § 5 of the FELA).
287. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995). Further support for the
application of common law contract principles is found in Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480
U.S. 386 (1987). In Rumery, the Court held that whether a waiver of a right to sue under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is unenforceable is resolved "by reference to traditional common-law
principles." Id. at 392. The Court then relied on contract law principles to determine
whether the waiver was unenforceable. See id. at 392 & n.2 (stating that "a promise is
unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a
public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement.").
288. Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 104 F.3d 89, 92 (6th Cir. 1997).
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to releases for those injuries and those risks known to the employee at the
time the release is executed. 289 These limitations are based on language in
Callen that a release is as valid as any other release "[w]here controversies
exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much . .,290
The
Third Circuit also limits the rule in Callen to situations in which the release
is "executed as part of a negotiation settling a dispute between the
employee and the employer., 291 If there is no negotiation, the release is
void under Section 5.292
These limitations have no impact on the rule applicable to Title VII
releases. The injury under Title VII is an adverse employment action, such
as a refusal to hire, a termination, the denial of a promotion, or a hostile
work environment, and the adverse employment action (at least with
respect to tangible adverse employment actions) occurs when it is
communicated to the employee. 293 Thus, the concern motivating the
limitations placed on Callen (an employee not knowing of a particular
injury or the risk of an injury at the time of signing a general release)
will
2 94
not apply in Title VII cases; the employee will be aware of the injury.
With respect to the Third Circuit's holding that Callen is limited to
situations in which the parties engage in negotiations, such a holding has
little support in Callen. There does not appear to have been much
negotiation in Callen, and the Supreme Court's holding was driven by its
refusal to establish a rule depriving settlements of their prima facie validity
absent evidence Congress intended such a change. Callen was based on the
Court deferring to common law principles in the absence of a contrary
indication from Congress, not on the need for negotiation. Even if
negotiation is needed to render enforceable a release of claims under the
FELA, this is best explained as a limitation imposed as a result of the
FELA's Section 5, a provision that does not have a similar counterpart in
Title VII.
In conclusion, the Court's statement in Callen that it was Congress'
place to deprive settlements of their prima facie validity, not the Court's,
and that releases executed by railroad employees therefore stand on the

289. Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998).
290. Babbitt at 92; Wicker at 697.
291. Wicker, 142 F.3d at 700.
292. Id.
293. Del. St. Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).
294. For example, the Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources, in its report
on the OWBPA, recognized that "[i]ndividual separation agreements are the result of actual
or expected adverse actions against an individual employee," and thus "[t]he employee
understands the action is being taken against him, and he may engage in arms-length
negotiation to resolve any differences with the employer." S. REP. No. 101-263, at 32
(1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 53 (1990) (making virtually identical
statements).
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same footing as releases by other employees (with the employee bearing
the burden of proving the release is tainted with invalidity through fraud or
mutual mistake), applies with equal force to the release of claims under
Title VII. Thus, Supreme Court precedent dictates that a contract law
analysis would provide the substance for any uniform federal common law
rule created to determine the enforceability of a Title VII release.
But there is a catch. As discussed below, under recent Supreme Court
precedent, state law should usually provide the substance of any federal
common law rule.
B.

Source of Law

The applicable source of law for assessing the validity of a Title VII
release is important because if the source of law is state law, federal courts
would not create a test to give content to the knowing and voluntary
standard. Rather, they would apply the law adopted by the forum state for
assessing the validity of a release of employment discrimination claims. If
the state does not have an employment discrimination statute, a federal
court would look to the law applied by the state in the most analogous
situation, such as the law applied by the state to releases of other statutory
rights. 295 A contract law analysis would usually be applied because states
generally treat a release as a contract whose validity is governed by
contract law rules.296

Few courts have analyzed the source of law question. The leading
case holding that creation of a federal common law rule is appropriate is
Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co. 29 7 In Fulgence, the Fifth Circuit
stated that "[c]reation of a federal rule rather than absorption of a state rule
is appropriate where, as here, the rights of the litigants and the operative
legal policies derive from a federal source. ' , 298 The court felt that "[n]o
significant state interest would be served by absorbing state law as the rule
of decision governing Title VII settlement agreements. 99 Fulgence
involved a Louisiana statute requiring settlement agreements to be written,
and the court held that Congress' policy of encouraging Title VII claims to
be settled was better served by a rule enforcing oral settlement

295. For example, courts look to the "most analogous" state statute of limitations when a
federal law does not contain its own statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 268 (1985) (holding that the "most analogous" state statute of limitations applies to
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not provide a specific limitations period).
296. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 491 ("In civil law, courts generally employ contract
terminology in judging the validity of waivers.").
297. 662 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981).
298. Id. at 1209.
299. Id.
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agreements.300
The leading cases advocating application of state law are Morgan v.
South Bend Community School Corp.30' and Makins v. District of
Columbia.3 °2 In Morgan, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Easterbrook, suggested (without deciding) that state law applied in
determining whether a school superintendent and a school board attorney
had authority to settle a Title VII claim brought against the school board.
Judge Easterbrook proposed that the Rules of Decision Act 3 3 and 42

U.S.C. § 1988(a) might prevent federal courts from applying federal
common law to issues involving the enforceability of Title VII releases.30 4
In Makins, the District of Columbia Circuit held that local law applied
in determining whether an attorney had authority to bind his client to a
Title VII agreement. 3°5 The court relied on Morgan, stating that "[t]he
power of the federal courts to formulate law in this area, and the need for
national uniformity, are doubtful at best, as Judge Easterbrook forcefully
demonstrated ....

,,306

The court noted that "[t]here is also an advantage for

members of the bar to know that in negotiating settlements, the law
governing the
validity of their agreements will be the same in federal and
' 30 7
state court. ,
What is interesting about these three cases is that none directly
involved whether a person's consent to a release was knowing and
voluntary.30 8 In fact, whether a uniform federal rule is needed in such a
circumstance has never been analyzed by a court. Whether federal law or
state law applies to such a situation depends on whether the Rules of
Decision Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) requires the application of state law,
and if neither does, whether the federal common law rule should borrow
state law for the federal rule's content. Each of these issues is addressed
below.

300. Id
301.
302.
303.
304.

797 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1986).
277 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
Morgan, 797 F.2d at 474-76.

305. 277 F.3d at 548.
306. Id. at 547-48.
307. Id. at 548.
308. Morgan and Makins, both involving the authority of a party's agent to enter into a
binding agreement on the party's behalf, can be viewed as indirectly involving the question
of whether the party's consent was knowing and voluntary.
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The Rules of Decision Act

The Rules of Decision Act, 30 9 first enacted as part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789,310 currently provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. 3 .
The Act, if taken literally, appears to preclude federal common law, and
this position has been adopted by some commentators, leading to academic
debate on the Act's scope.312
However, "[i]n general, the modem Supreme Court treats the Act not
31 3
to lawmaking [by federal courts] but 'as if it did not exist.'
barrier
a
as
The Court has stated that a federal statute's silence on an issue
"is no reason for limiting the reach of federal law ....

To the

contrary, the inevitable incompleteness presented by all
legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic
responsibility of the federal courts. 'At the very least, effective
Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal
courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial
legislation,' rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially
or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large
by Congress. In other words, it must mean recognition of federal
judicial competence to declare the governing law in an area
comprising issues substantially related to an established program
of government operation.' ... "

Since Erie [R.R. v. Tompkins3 14], no decision of this Court has
held or suggested that the Act requires borrowing state law to fill
gaps in federal substantive statutes....
[N]either Erie nor the Rules of Decision Act can now be taken
as establishing a mandatory rule that we apply state law in

309. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
310. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). Rules of decision are "the laws which are applied by
courts to determine the questions brought before them." Note, Rules of Decision in
Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1428 n.6 (1960).
312. Compare Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761 (1989)
(arguing that the Rules of Decision Act precludes federal common law) with Louise
Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal
Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 860 (1989) (arguing that the Rules of Decision Act does
not preclude federal common law).
313. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 31 (1985) (quoting PHILIP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN
COURT 62 (1970)).
314. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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federal interstices.3 15
Thus, as long as the area in question comprises issues related to an
established program of government operation, the Act does not require a
federal court to apply state law. Since the enforceability of a Title VII
release is related to an established program of government operation, the
Rules of Decision Act does not require a federal court to apply state law to
determine the effectiveness of such a release. This is supported by the
Supreme Court's decisions in which the Court applied federal common law
to determine the enforceability of releases of claims under other federal
statutes.316 Unless the Rules of Decision Act undergoes a reinterpretation
by the Supreme Court, the Act does not prevent federal courts from
creating a federal common law rule to determine the effectiveness of a Title
VII release.1 7

315. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-61 n.13 (1983) (quoting
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)). But see Reed v.
Smithkline Beckman Corp., 569 F. Supp. 672, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that defenses of
duress and coercion to Title VII release were grounded in state law, and under the Erie
doctrine, state law applied). The Reed decision is incorrect. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that the enforceability of a release of federal claims is a question of federal
law. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("The agreement
purported to waive a right to sue conferred by a federal statute. The question whether the
policies underlying [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . may in some circumstances render that waiver
unenforceable is a question of federal law."); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R.,
342 U.S. 359 (1952) (applying federal common law to determine the enforceability of a
release of an FELA claim); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942)
(applying federal common law to determine the enforceability of a release of a Jones Act
claim). The Supreme Court has held that even when an action under a federal statute is
brought in state court, the enforceability of a release of the federal claim is a matter of
substantive law, not procedural law, and is governed by federal law. Garrett, 317 U.S. at
243-45; see also Cohn, supra note 284, at 345, 347 ("Under the doctrine of Erie Railroadv.
Tompkins, the interpretation of a release is a substantive matter subject to the same law in
both state and federal court ... [and] [d]efenses to federal claims, such as release or laches,
are sufficiently intertwined with the claims themselves to enter the realm of federal
competence .... ") (footnote omitted). The decisions previously discussed, which note there
is an issue as to whether state law applies to common law contract defenses such as fraud,
duress, and mistake, see supra note 151, have overlooked Garrett. Under Garrett, any
defenses to avoid enforcement of a release of federal claims are governed by federal, not
state, law. Of course, this does not mean that federal law will not borrow state law to
provide the substance of its rule. Also, to the extent state law recognizes a breach of
contract cause of action for the breach of a covenant not to sue in a Title VII release, state
law would presumably apply to that cause of action. The viability of such a cause of action
would depend, however, on the release first being deemed enforceable under federal law,
and on a determination that such a state law cause of action does not frustrate Title VII's
objectives.
316. Supra note 315.
317. See Cohn, supra note 284, at 347 ("All federal claims, by definition, fall within the
sweep of a constitutional grant of power to the federal government .... Federal courts thus
have power to choose rules of decision for all releases of federal claims.").
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the enforceability of releases under Title VII, an employer knows the
EEOC retains the right to sue, thereby deterring violations of Title VII. 372
Third, the remedies available to a plaintiff in a Title VII action-including
back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
attorney's fees 37 3-coupled with the cost of defending a Title VII action,
render it unlikely that easier enforcement of releases would increase
noncompliance, particularly when an employer has no guarantee a person
subjected to unlawful employment discrimination will agree to release his
or her Title VII claim (and agree to do so for less than fair compensation).
With respect to the third reason, the situation is similar to the one
addressed by the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann,74 in which the
Court upheld the application of a Louisiana survivorship law to a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though the state statute extinguished the
claim because the decedent was not survived by any close relatives (as
required by the state statute). 375 The Court rejected the argument that the
claim's extinguishment was inconsistent with § 1983's deterrent objective:
A state official contemplating illegal activity must always be
prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed
against him. In light of this prospect, even an official aware of
the intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law would hardly be
influenced in his behavior by its provisions. In order to find even
a marginal influence on behavior as a result of Louisiana's
survivorship provisions, one would have to make the rather
farfetched assumptions that a state official had both the desire
and the ability deliberately to select as victims only those persons
who would die before the conclusion of the § 1983 suit ...and
who would not be survived by any close relatives.376

specific relief after the employee settles his or her claim with the employer. See Senich v.
American-Republican, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D. Conn. 2003) (granting the EEOC's
motion to file an amended complaint to seek victim-specific relief for plaintiffs who signed
waivers and releases with employer as a condition of receiving severance payments).
372. The members of the House of Representatives who opposed the OWBPA made a
similar argument:
[P]roponents claim that waivers, however knowing and voluntary on the part of
the employee, are used as shields by employers for discriminatory actions.
Employers can, thus, ignore the law with impunity. In fact, however, EEOC's
authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the law is clearly unaffected
by waivers signed by employees, although a valid waiver may preclude
recovery of individual damages, and a waiver cannot prohibit an individual
from filing, or participating in the investigation of, a charge with the EEOC.
H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 88 (1990) (dissenting views).
373. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
374. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
375. Id. at 593.
376. Id. at 592 & n.10. Robertson relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the application of state
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Similarly, an employer contemplating unlawful discriminatory
conduct must always be prepared to face the prospect of a Title VII action.
To mimic the language in Robertson, even an employer aware of the
intricacies of state contract law would hardly be influenced in its behavior
by such law. In order to find even a marginal influence on behavior as a
result of applying state contract law, one would have to make the rather
farfetched assumptions that an employer had both the desire and ability to
deliberately select as victims those persons who, after being discriminated
against, would agree to release their Title VII claims, and who would
release their claims in a manner that would result in enforcement of the
release under a contract law test when it would not be enforced under the
totality of the circumstances test. Further, there is no evidence to support
the belief that persons release meritorious Title VII claims for less than
adequate compensation often enough to undermine Title VII's deterrent
objective.377
With respect to Title VII's compensatory objective, application of
contract law rules could frustrate this objective in specific situations, but
not in every case. If a person executes a Title VII release without a full
understanding of the legal consequences, or does so in a situation of
unequal bargaining power, there is a greater chance the person will not
receive fair value for his or her claim than if he or she entered into the
agreement completely knowingly and voluntarily. However, application of
contract law rules would only frustrate Title VII's compensatory objective
in those situations in which the employer in fact violated Title VII (if the
employer did not violate Title VII, the complaining person would not be
entitled to compensation), and the releasing person did not receive fair
compensation for the violation.
For a court to determine that application of a contract law analysis
law. It is an unresolved issue whether § 1988 provides for a stronger presumption that state
law should be applied than the general presumption under Kamen v. Kemper Financial
Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991), that state law should be incorporated. If § 1988 does
not apply to Title VII actions, this would be an important issue for purposes of Robertson's
weight as precedent with respect to Title VII claims. Title VII, however, has a provision
similar to § 1988:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title
operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any
provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law
unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any
provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2000). This provision, which supports application of state law, has
been neglected by the courts when determining the appropriate source of law for evaluating
Title VII releases.
377. If the person received adequate compensation, Title VII's deterrent objective will
likely be achieved.
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would frustrate Title VII's compensatory objective in a specific case, the
court would have to determine that a violation occurred and that the
consideration provided was insufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his
or her damages.378 Thus, if an employer demonstrates that the release
should be enforced under state law (but cannot demonstrate it should be
enforced under the totality of the circumstances test), and then prevails on
the merits at trial, an application of state law could not frustrate Title VII's
compensatory purpose, and the release should be enforced. Of course, for
the defendant who has already defended the case on the merits and won,
such a victory would be largely academic, and probably pyrrhic, though the
employer might recover attorney's fees as damages under a breach of
contract theory (if the employer had asserted a breach of contract
counterclaim).37 9

To help reduce situations in which an employer demonstrates the
enforceability of a release under state law, only to have the court postpone
a determination that state law applies until after the employer prevails on
the merits, the court might require the plaintiff, early in the litigation, to
demonstrate that his or her case has a certain degree of merit. If the
plaintiff fails to make such a demonstration, it is unlikely Title VII's
compensatory purpose will be frustrated by an application of state law
because it is improbable the plaintiff is entitled to any compensation.
Requiring a plaintiff in a Title VII action to make such a preliminary
378. When determining whether the amount of compensation is adequate, the plaintiffs
ability to avoid the transaction costs of litigation should be added to the tangible
consideration provided. See Silverstein, supra note 4, at 492 (noting that parties often settle
lawsuits because they are emotionally draining and time consuming). Also, when assessing
the value of the claim, the valuation must take into account the uncertainty of litigation.
Thus, receiving $35,000 today might be of more value than pursuing a claim in which the
plaintiff has a fifty percent chance of prevailing and receiving $100,000, after taking into
account the chance of losing, the undesirability of risk, the costs involved (which cannot be
recovered if the plaintiff loses), the emotional toll, the necessary time investment, and the
reduction of damages to present value.
379. Courts disagree whether a defendant can recover attorney's fees incurred in
defending an action brought in violation of a covenant not to sue when the agreement did
not include an attorney's fee provision. Compare Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 700 F.2d 1067, 1072 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant union could
assert a claim for attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending action brought by plaintiff
company in alleged breach of covenant not to sue in collective bargaining agreement), and
Widener v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 717 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding in an
ADEA action that an employer was entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending action as damages for the plaintiff's breach of covenant not to sue), with Gruver
v. Midas Int'l Corp., 925 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding attorney's fees are not
awardable unless the agreement includes an attorney's fee provision), and Carroll v.
Primerica Fin. Servs. Ins. Mktg., 811 F. Supp. 1558, 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding in an
ADEA action that breach of a release may only be used for defensive purposes unless the
release expressly provides for damages in the event of a breach, or the subsequent lawsuit
was brought in bad faith).
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showing is not unprecedented. For example, in determining whether to
appoint an attorney to represent a plaintiff under Section 706(f) of Title
VII, courts examine the merits of the plaintiff s claim.380
However, that a plaintiff with a meritorious claim who received less
than fair compensation for his or her damages might lose the litigation
under a contract law test (because the release is enforced) is insufficient to
find such a test inconsistent with Title VII's compensatory purpose. As the
Court stated in Robertson v. Wegmann 31 1 with respect to a § 1983 claim:
A state statute cannot be considered "inconsistent" with federal
law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the
litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the only
benchmark there would be no reason at all to look to state law,
for the appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring
the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant.382
Thus, under Robertson, a contract law analysis would not significantly
conflict with Title VII's compensatory purpose.
Professor Eileen Silverstein has argued that releases of employment
discrimination claims result in the employer and the employee deregulating
by contract, thus thwarting the legislative will to prevent harm.38 3 She also
380. See, e.g., Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir.
1992) (recognizing the merits of plaintiffs case as a factor in the appointment of counsel in
a Title VII case); Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1990) (including "the
merits of the plaintiffs claims of discrimination' as an element for consideration); Jones v.
WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing the merits of plaintiffs
claim as a factor for consideration in the appointment of counsel in a Title VII case),
overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th
Cir. 1981). At least one court has held a hearing on the issue at which the trial judge
questioned the plaintiff. See Battie v.- Freeman Decorating, No. Civ.A. 0 1-2282, 2001 WL
883884, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2001) (mentioning the conference held by a magistrate
judge on the issue of appointment of counsel during which the plaintiff was sworn and
testified). Courts differ on the standard to be applied when determining if the plaintiffs
case has merit. Compare Vera v. Utah Dep't of Human Servs., No. 99-4069, 203 F.3d 836,
2000 WL 130717, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (stating that
the standard is "lower than the standard in motions for summary judgment"), Poindexter v.
FBI, 737 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[If] ... the plaintiff appears to have some
chance of prevailing, then appointment should not be refused for want of a meritorious
claim."), and Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir.
1981) (stating that the plaintiff must only show that the claim has "some merit"), with Smith
v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 91 Civ. 2301 (MJL), 1993 WL 106395, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,
1993) (holding that the standard is higher than simply avoiding summary judgment).
381. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
382. Id. at 593.
383. Silverstein, supra note 4, at 493. Professor Silverstein questions the enforceability
of any "waivers-for-private-gain" with respect to statutory employment rights. (Professor
Silverstein defines "waivers-for-private-gain" as waivers occurring before the filing of an
administrative complaint or civil action, as opposed to "waivers-by-settlement," which
occur after the filing of an administrative complaint or civil action. Id. at 484-86.) Thus,
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argues that "the security of believing that legal action will not follow
allows decision-makers, if they wish, to engage in the very conduct
prohibited by the laws. 3 84 She therefore concludes that "[t]he twin goals
of deterrence and compensation are simply not served by allowing
employers to contract out of the non-discrimination mandate by drafting
'
sophisticated waiver clauses."385
Professor Silverstein, however, was not analyzing these issues in the
choice of law context and thus did not assess whether such releases
"significantly conflict" with Title VII's objectives (as opposed to simply
not serving Title VII's objectives). Professor Silverstein also fails to note
that the compensatory objective would only be frustrated if Title VII was in
fact violated and the amount of compensation was inadequate, and she fails
to address Robertson. With respect to the argument that enforcing releases
will encourage employers to discriminate, I have previously addressed and
rejected such an assertion. No employer can predict whether a particular
employee will release his or her claims. It is farfetched to believe that an
employer would unlawfully discriminate against a particular person
because the employer believes it will be able to extract a release from the
employee after committing the act of discrimination. Few employers
would actually believe "legal action will not follow" simply because there
is a chance the employee might sign a release.386
In any event, a federal court should not simply assume the forum
state's laws frustrate Title VII's objectives, and should not consider
creating a federal common law rule until after it has analyzed the state's
laws. Upon inspection, the forum state's laws might be sufficient to
address the concerns raised by the courts adopting the totality of the
circumstances test.
Significantly, the rule prohibiting avoidance of a contract based on
unilateral mistake has often been relaxed. In fact, the general rule
prohibiting avoidance based on unilateral mistake has been ignored in
numerous decisions,3 87 and the broad generalization that relief will only be
given for mutual mistakes has been described as "misleading and

she does not address whether the totality of the circumstances test or a contract law test is
appropriate, or whether the appropriate source of law should be federal law or state law.
However, her argument that any waivers-for-private-gain thwart Title VII's objectives is
also relevant in determining whether the more lenient contract law waiver test would thwart
Title VII's objectives.
384. Id. at 493

385. Id.
at 494.
386. While some terminated employees have a strong incentive to sign a release in
exchange for much needed money, many of these employees, disgruntled by their
termination, will have little interest in accepting a small amount of consideration for the
release.
387. CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.39, at 224.
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untrue."3'88 Today, avoidance is generally allowed for unilateral mistake if
two conditions exist: "(1) enforcement of the contract against the mistaken
party would be oppressive or, at least, result in an unconscionably unequal
exchange of values; 389
and (2) avoidance would impose no substantial
hardship on the other.,
Under modem rules of unilateral mistake, "even a negligent party may
obtain relief for mistake if the other party is given prompt notice before
changing position materially and the rights of third parties have not
intervened., 390 This view allows avoidance for a unilateral mistake even
when the party was careless (since a careless act is not equated with a
wrongful act), as long as the "mistake is convincingly proved and the other
party can be restored to the status quo ante., 391 Thus, even a failure to read
will not prohibit avoidance if the two conditions for avoidance are
otherwise established.392 Also, a party's mistake as to his or her existing
393
legal rights may be treated as a mistake of fact.

388. Id.
389. Id. For example,
Florida case law allows for application of the unilateral mistake doctrine where
all of the following conditions are met: (1) "the mistake goes to the substance
of the agreement," (2) the error does not result from an inexcusable lack of due
care, and (3) the other party has not relied upon the mistake to his detriment.
Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Hardaway Co., 152 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Langbein v. Comerford, 215 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)).
390. CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.39, at 232. The American Law Institute accepted this
position:
The mere fact that a mistaken party could have avoided the mistake by the
exercise of reasonable care does not preclude either avoidance . . . or
reformation.... Indeed, since a party can often avoid a mistake by the exercise
of such care, the availability of relief would be severely circumscribed if he
were to be barred by his negligence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. a (1979). However, "in extreme cases
the mistaken party's fault is a proper ground for denying him relief for a mistake that he
otherwise could have avoided." Id.
391. CORBrN, supra note 169, § 28.38, at 213-14.
392. Id. For example, it has been said that "the failure to read an instrument is not
negligence per se but must be considered in light of all surrounding facts and
circumstances." Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 136 (4th Cir.
1967). But see Lex Tenants Corp. v. Gramercy N. Assocs., 624 N.Y.S.2d 414, 414-15
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that a party who fails to read a contract before signing it
does not exercise ordinary care and bears the risk of a unilateral mistake under § 154 of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981)).

393. CORB1N, supra note 169, § 28.53, at 369. This is true even when the party's mistake
is based on a mistake or ignorance of a rule of law. Id. For example,
in numerous cases the mistake as to "rights" is caused solely by a mistake as to
the rules of law that are to be applied to the known facts. In these cases, in
order to avoid seeming conflict with common statements as to "mistake of law,"
emphasis is placed upon mistake of the resulting "rights," so that the case may
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The modem law of mistake appears particularly well suited for
ensuring Title VII's objectives are not frustrated by persons releasing
claims.
For example, the requirement that the release include an
"unconscionably unequal exchange of values" focuses the inquiry on the
very releases most likely to frustrate Title VII's deterrent and
compensatory objectives-those for inadequate consideration. Also, in the
case of a release of claims, "there is less likelihood that a change of
position by the releasee
should prevent a setting aside of the release for
394
unilateral mistake.,
State contract rules preventing the enforcement of unconscionable
contracts might also be sufficient to address the concerns of the courts
adopting the totality of the circumstances test. There are two types of
unconscionability:
substantive
and procedural.
Substantive
unconscionability involves contracts whose terms are "one-sided or overly
harsh.9 395
"'Shocking to the conscience', 'monstrously harsh', and
'exceedingly calloused' are terms sometimes used to define substantive
unconscionability. 3 96
Procedural unconscionability is the lack of a
meaningful choice, considering all the surrounding circumstances, and
including the manner in which the parties entered into the contract, whether
the party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the contract's terms
and whether important terms were hidden in fine print.3 97
Interestingly, one court's explanation of procedural unconscionability
is strikingly reminiscent of the knowing and voluntary standard adopted by
the totality of the circumstances courts:
The indicators of procedural unconscionability generally fall into
two areas: (1) lack of knowledge, and (2) lack of voluntariness.
A lack of knowledge is demonstrated by a lack of understanding
of the contract terms arising from inconspicuous print or the use
of complex, legalistic language, disparity in sophistication of
parties, and lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire
about contract terms. A lack of voluntariness is demonstrated in
contracts of adhesion when there is a great imbalance in the
parties' relative bargaining power, the stronger party's terms are
unnegotiable, and the weaker party is prevented by market

be classified as one involving "mistake of fact."
Id.
at 371. "[T]he modem view is that the existing law is part of the state of facts at the time
of agreement. Therefore, most courts will grant relief for such a mistake, as they would for
any other mistake of fact." FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, § 9.2, at 649.
394. CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.28, at 213-14.
395. Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1975)).
396. Adler, 103 P.3d at 781 (quoting Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash.
1995).
397. Adler, 103 P.3d at 781.
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factors, timing or other pressures from being able to contract with
another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from
contracting at all.398
Courts are split on whether both substantive and procedural
unconscionability must exist to void a contract or whether just one is
sufficient. 399 Although in some states procedural as well as substantive
unconscionability must be established, for those states that only require
substantive unconscionability, the analysis will focus on those contracts
that could potentially frustrate Title VII's deterrent and compensatory
objectives-contracts in which the employer provides little consideration
for a release.
This is not to say that state contract law rules will result in essentially
the same standard being applied as that applied under the totality of the
circumstances test. As previously discussed, the two tests have significant
differences, including which party bears the burden of proof regarding the
validity or invalidity of the release. However, many contract law rules
address the types of concerns raised by the courts adopting the totality of
the circumstances test, further supporting that state contract law rules will
not generally frustrate Title VII's objectives. In those situations in which a
contract law rule is particularly harsh (such as the Ohio rule discussed in
Dice, perhaps), application of a uniform federal common law rule would be
appropriate.
In addition to Dice, Supreme Court cases identify other situations in
which a common law rule might frustrate Title VII's objectives. For
example, in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. 0 'Neil,400 the Court refused to apply
to a release of FLSA claims a New York statute that rendered written
releases enforceable despite an absence of consideration. In Brooklyn
Savings, the defendant conditioned the payment of wages owed under the
FLSA on the execution of a release by the plaintiff waiving his entitlement
to liquidated damages under Section 16(b) of the FLSA. 40 ' There was no
consideration because there was no bona fide dispute regarding liability.4 2
The Court held that enforcing the release would thwart the legislative will
of the FLSA:
398. Bank of Ind., v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109-10 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (citations
omitted).
399. See Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 927 (2000) (discussing the split among jurisdictions as to whether to
require solely substantive unconscionability to void a contract or whether procedural
unconscionability is necessary as well).
400. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
401. Id. at 700. Under section 16(b) of the FLSA, a plaintiff, in addition to being able to
recover any wages owed, is entitled to an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
402. 324 U.S. at 703.
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To permit an employer to secure a release from the worker who
needs his wages promptly will tend to nullify the deterrent effect
which Congress plainly intended that § 16(b) should have.
Knowledge on the part of the employer that he cannot escape
liability for liquidated damages by taking advantage of the needs
of his employees tends to insure compliance in the first place. To
allow contracts for waiver of liquidated damages approximates
situations where courts have uniformly held that contracts
tending to encourage
violations of law are void as contrary to
40 3
public policy.
Thus, under Brooklyn Savings, a state law (such as New York's)
enforcing a release without consideration would frustrate Title VII's
deterrent objective when the employer conditions the receipt of
compensation indisputably owed upon the execution of a release of Title
VII claims, at least when the employee signed the release because of
financial need. 404 The holding in Brooklyn Savings was reaffirmed in
Maynard v. Durham & Southern Railway,4 5 in which the Court held that
consideration is necessary to render a release of federal statutory claims
enforceable.4 °6
In Hogue v. Southern Railway,40 7 the Court held that an employee
seeking to void a release under the FELA was not required to tender back
the consideration as a prerequisite to filing suit,40 8 a common requirement
under contract law rules.40 9 In Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.,4 ° the
Court, in a case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967,411 expanded on the rationale for rejecting the tender back rule with
respect to plaintiffs seeking to void releases of federal claims, stating that
In many instances a discharged employee likely will have spent
the moneys received and will lack the means to tender their
return.
These realities might tempt employers to risk
403. Id. at 709-10.
404. What is interesting about Brooklyn Savings is that it analogized the situation to a
contract void under public policy because it encouraged violations of the law. Id. at 710.
Thus, even when holding a particular state law inconsistent with a federal law's objectives,
the Court relied on the language of contract law. The Court has also relied on contract law
principles to assess whether a waiver of the right to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
enforceable. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 & n.2 (1987) (looking to
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) to resolve the question of the

enforceability of a waiver).
405. 365 U.S. 160 (1961).
406. Id. at 163.
407. 390 U.S. 516 (1968).
408. Id. at 517.
409. But see Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998) (questioning
how unified the states are with respect to adopting the tender back rule).
410. 522 U.S. 422 (1998).
411. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
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noncompliance with the OWBPA's waiver provisions, knowing
it will be difficult to repay the moneys and relying on ratification.
We ought not to open the door to an evasion of the statute by this
device.412

Thus, under these authorities, the tender back rule might arguably be
inconsistent with Title VII's deterrent objective.413
In conclusion, while the application of contract law rules might at
times have the potential to frustrate Title VII's objectives, in general, such
rules do not significantly conflict with this attainment. Kimbell's second
factor therefore favors the incorporation of state law.
c.

Commercial relationship

An application of the third factor does not favor the use of state law.
A release of employment discrimination claims cannot be considered a
commercial transaction. For example, a release of a personal injury claim,
which is analogous to an employment discrimination claim, is not
considered a commercial transaction.4 14
d.

Conclusion with respect to the Kimbellfactors

An analysis of the Kimbell factors, behind the presumption that state
law should apply, demonstrates that in general, a federal common law rule
for assessing the enforceability of a Title VII release is unwarranted.
Courts adopting the totality of the circumstances test as a rule of federal
412. 522 U.S. at 427.
413. See also Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1942) (holding that employee need
not return money prior to filing suit under the FELA even though the money was provided
by the employer in return for the employee's promise to negotiate a potential resolution of
the claim prior to filing suit and based on the premise that the money would be returned
prior to filing suit). Whether the tender back rule applies to Title VII releases is an issue
over which the courts have disagreed. Compare Fleming v. United States Post. Serv. AMF
O'Hare, 27 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying tender back rule) and Halstead v. Am.
Int'l Group Inc., No. Civ. 04-815-SLR, 2005 WL 8852001, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2005)
(applying tender back rule), with Rangel v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 996 F. Supp. 1093,
1099 (D. N.M. 1998) (rejecting tender back rule). When the tender back rule is applied, the
appropriate source of law is an issue. See, e.g., Cuchara v. GAI-Tronics Corp., 129 F.
App'x 728, 732 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Pennsylvania law to the employee's assertion that
he was fraudulently induced to enter into a release of Title VII and ADA claims, and
holding that, under Pennsylvania law, the employee's failure to return the consideration
"dooms his fraudulent inducement claim"); Halsteadat *2 (applying Delaware law). Even
if the tender back rule is held inapplicable to a Title VII release, the related concept of
ratification might still be applicable. See, e.g., Aikins v. Tosco Refining Co., No. C-9800755-CRB, 1999 WL 179686, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1999) ("[A] release may be
ratified even where the tender back rule is inapplicable").
414. CORBIN, supra note 169, § 28.34, at 174-75.
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common law have argued that the test is consistent with the strong
congressional purpose of eradicating employment discrimination.4 15 While
this might be true (because such a rule enforces fewer releases), the
standard is whether a particular state law significantly conflicts with Title
VII's objectives. Even in those cases in which state law applies common
law contract principles to determine the enforceability of a release, this
standard will usually not be met.
V.

CONCLUSION

Supreme Court precedent dictates that if a uniform federal common
law rule regarding the enforceability of Title VII releases is appropriate,
contract law principles generally apply.
Thus, the totality of the
circumstances test cannot be sustained under Supreme Court precedent, and
those courts adopting a contract law test as a matter of federal common law
are correct (if a uniform federal common law rule is appropriate).
However, under recent Supreme Court precedent, state law should
generally be used to provide the substance of the federal common law rule
governing the enforceability of a Title VII release.

415. Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 1995);
Bormann v. AT & T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989); Coventry v. United
States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1988) (pre-OWBPA ADEA claim).

